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I. INTRODUCTION 
Idaho adheres to the “American Rule,” which requires each party to 
pay its own attorney fees unless otherwise provided by statute or con-
tract.1 In Idaho, as elsewhere in the country, an ever-growing number of 
statutes and court rules allow for attorney fee awards based either on 
the substance of the underlying litigation, or as a sanction for improper 
party conduct. The wide array of statutes providing for awards of attor-
ney fees are, for the most part, highly context-specific. Where a litigant 
fails to correctly apply a statutory or contractual provision to the facts of 
her case, she may disqualify herself from receiving an award of attorney 
fees from the outset. Thus, it is useful for litigants in Idaho courts to 
understand the basic mechanisms by which a party may obtain an 
award of attorney fees.  
This Article is intended to provide an up-to-date overview of the 
statutes and procedural rules governing attorney fee awards in Idaho.2 
This Article deals only with attorney fee awards under Idaho law, as 
applied in Idaho courts.3 Within that context, several generally applica-
ble principles and procedural considerations deserve attention at the 
outset. 
Idaho courts do not possess a general equitable authority to order a 
party to pay an opponent’s attorney fees.4 Thus, a party seeking an 
award of attorney fees must cite a statutory or contractual basis for do-
ing so.5 Where a party sets forth multiple claims, each claim for which 
                                                       
 1. Mortenson v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 235 P.3d 387, 398, 149 Idaho 437, 448 
(2010).  
 2. For previous commentary on attorney feee awards in Idaho, see Hon. Jesse R. 
Walters, Jr., A Primer for Awarding Attorney Fees in Idaho, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2001); see 
also Mark D. Perison, A Guide to Attorney Fee Awards in Idaho, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 29 (1995). 
 3. This Article does not attempt a discussion of attorney fee awards based on fed-
eral statutes, rules, or caselaw.  
 4. Fournier v. Fournier, 874 P.2d 600, 602, 125 Idaho 789, 791 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1994).  
 5. Mortenson, 235 P.3d at 398, 149 Idaho at 437. 




she would like to obtain an award of attorney fees must be accompanied 
by a relevant basis.6 It bears mentioning that pro se litigants are not 
entitled to attorney fees.7  However, attorney fees may be awarded 
against pro se litigants.8 
A party invoking a statutory basis for an award of attorney fees 
should be aware that a substantial number of Idaho statutes allow for 
attorney fees only to a “prevailing party.”9 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54 sets forth the method by which a trial court is to determine when a 
party prevails: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party 
and entitled to costs, the trial court shall . . . consider the final 
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought 
by the respective parties. The trial court in its sound discretion 
may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and 
did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the 
costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable 
manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in 
the action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained.10 
Although both parties may partially prevail at trial,11 Idaho Supreme 
Court cases suggest that on appeal, only one party may prevail for the 
purposes of a “prevailing party” analysis.12 The Idaho Supreme Court 
has also held that where a case is remanded, neither party can be said 
to “prevail” on appeal for the purposes of an attorney fee award based on 
a “prevailing party” analysis.13  
In order to properly request attorney fees after a jury verdict or 
court decision, a party must submit her memorandum of costs within 14 
days of the entry of judgment.14 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(5), 
which governs the proper procedure for filing a memorandum of costs, 
provides: 
                                                       
 6. Willie v. Bd. of Trustees, 59 P.3d 302, 307, 138 Idaho 131, 136 (1996).  
 7. See Michalk v. Michalk, 220 P.3d 580, 591, 148 Idaho 224, 235 (2009). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE  § 12-120(1) (2015) (providing for attorney fees for prevail-
ing parties in civil actions where amount pleaded does not exceed $35,000); IDAHO CODE § 12-
120(3) (2015) (providing for attorney fees for prevailing parties in civil actions brought to 
enforce commercial transactions); but c.f. IDAHO CODE § 32-704(3) (2015) (providing for at-
torney fees in divorce proceedings based on a series of elements dealing with the circum-
stance of the parties rather than a prevailing party analysis). 
 10. IDAHO R. CIV. P. 54(e)(1)(B). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Sanders v. Bd. of Trs., 322 P.3d 1002, 1007, 156 Idaho 269, 274 (2014) (de-
clining to award attorney fees on appeal where both parties prevailed in part). 
 13. Hoskins v. Circle A Constr., Inc. 63 P.3d 462, 469, 138 Idaho 336, 343 (2001). 
 14. IDAHO R. CIV. P. 54(d)(5). Because attorney fees are deemed “costs” under the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,14 a request for attorney fees must be included in this memo-
randum. 
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At any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court, 
any party who claims costs may file and serve on adverse parties 
a memorandum of costs, itemizing each claimed expense, but 
such memorandum of costs may not be filed later than fourteen 
(14) days after entry of judgment . . . . Failure to file such memo-
randum of costs within the period prescribed by this rule shall 
be a waiver of the right of costs.15 
 
Under this rule, a party may also request attorney fees prior to the en-
try of judgment.16 A party who does not comply with these timing re-
quirements is deemed to have waived her right to an award of attorney 
fees and costs.17  
A party who does not timely file her memorandum of costs can 
move the court to enlarge the time for filing.18 However, such a motion 
will only be granted where the moving party can show that her failure 
to timely file the memorandum of costs was the result of “excusable ne-
glect.”19 Because there is little case law dealing with the definition of 
“excusable neglect” with regard to an untimely memorandum of costs,20 
an attorney would be well-advised not to take any chances, and to file 
her memorandum of costs within the fourteen-day timeframe prescribed 
by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. A party seeking an award of at-
torney fees must also submit an affidavit wherein the attorney explains 
the "basis and method of computation of the attorney fees claimed.”21  
When determining what amount of attorney fees is appropriate, 
a trial judge must examine the factors set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(e)(3):  
 
•  the time and labor required; 
 
•  the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 
 
•  the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the 
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field 
of law; 
 
•  the prevailing charges for like work; 
                                                       
 15. IDAHO R. CIV. P. 54(d)(5). 
 16. Id. (“A memorandum of costs prematurely filed shall be considered as timely.”). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Idaho R. Civ. P. 6(b). 
 19. Id.; see also Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(5).  
 20. Multiple searches in Westlaw for excusable neglect in the context of an untime-
ly memorandum of costs revealed only a single unpublished case. See generally Mesenbrink 
Lumber, LLC v. Lightly, No. 38451, 2014 WL 3895234. 
 21. IDAHO R. CIV. P. 54(e)(5). 





•  whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 
 
•  the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances 
of the case; 
 
•  the amount involved and the results obtained; 
 
•  the undesirability of the case;  
 
•  the nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client; 
 
•  awards in similar cases; 
 
•  the reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer As-
sisted Legal Ressearch), if the court finds it was reasonably 
necessary in preparing a party’s case; and 
 
•  any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the par-
ticular case.22 
 
This lengthy list of factors provides judges with a great deal of discre-
tion in determining what amount of attorney fees is appropriate. 
On appeal, the standard of review for a trial court’s award of attor-
ney fees is abuse of discretion.23  
II. ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS PURSUANT TO CONTRACTUAL 
PROVISIONS 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) provides that a court may 
award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party when such an 
award is authorized by contract.24 Idaho Courts have reasoned that con-
tractual terms which provide for the recovery of attorney fees arising 
from actions to enforce the contract demonstrate that the contracting 
parties chose to place the risk of litigation expenses on the unsuccessful 
party.25 As the product of voluntary, mutual choice, such contractual 
provisions are “generally honored in Idaho.”26  While attorney fee 
awards pursuant to contract are as varied as the contractual terms 
providing for such awards, it may be helpful to note a few overall rules.  
                                                       
 22. IDAHO R. CIV. P. 54(e)(3)(A) through (L). 
 23. Berkshire Invs., LLC v. Taylor, 278 P.3d 943, 956, 153 Idaho 73, 86 (2013). 
 24. Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(1).  
 25. Holmes v. Holmes, 874 P.2d 595, 598, 125 Idaho 784, 787 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994). 
 26. Zenner v. Holcomb, 210 P.3d 553, 560, 147 Idaho 444, 452 (2009). 
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First, if parties dispute the meaning of a contractual provision re-
lating to attorney’s fees, a court will—as with any contract—adhere to 
the plain language of the contract.27 Only where a contractual provision 
is ambiguous will a court go beyond the language of the contract itself to 
determine the parties’ intent.28  
Second, even where a contract is not otherwise enforceable, a court 
may award attorney fees under that contract.29 This concept is illus-
trated in Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP v. Haroldson, decided by 
the Idaho Supreme Court in 2008.30 There, a land contract that did not 
comply with the statute of frauds was held to be unenforceable.31 How-
ever, the Court nevertheless allowed for an award of attorney fees under 
an attorney fee provision within the contract.32 The Court explained 
that “[a] party may be awarded attorney fees based on an agreement so 
providing, even when the court determines that the agreement is not 
enforceable.”33 
 Third, where a contractual provision only provides for an award of 
fees to only one party to the contract, “[the] provision cannot be given 
reciprocal effect so as to award attorney fees to the other party.”34 Thus, 
if A and B enter into a contract, and a provision of that contract pro-
vides only for an award of attorney fees to A in an action to enforce the 
contract, B cannot cite that provision to obtain an award of attorney 
fees.35 
Fourth, where there is a conflict between a statute and a parties’ 
contractual provision, the contractual provision will prevail.36 Idaho 
courts give great deference to the bargained-for terms of an agreement 
between contracting parties.37 For example, in Zenner v. Holcomb, the 
Idaho Supreme Court illustrated the high value that Idaho courts place 
on the freedom to contract. There, the Court explained that where the 
terms of a contract conflict with a statute, the terms of the contract will 
govern: 
In Farm Credit Bank, we stated that I.C. § 12-120 “does not 
override a valid agreement . . . .” . . . Likewise, we hold that the 
general entitlement to costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1) does not 
                                                       
 27. Mihalka v. Shepherd, 181 P.3d 473, 478, 145 Idaho 547, 552 (2008). 
 28. Id. (holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining conduct a 
factual inquiry into the meaning of an unambiguous contractual provision). 
 29. See Bauchman-Kingston P’ship, LP v. Haroldson, 233 P.3d 18, 25, 149 Idaho 87, 
94 (2008) (holding that a provision granting attorney fees in a land contract that did not 
comply with the statute of frauds was enforceable).  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Hon. Jesse R. Walters, Jr., A Primer for Awarding Attorney Fees in Idaho, 38 
IDAHO L. REV. 1, 62 (2001). 
 35. See id. 
 36. Zenner v. Holcomb, 210 P.3d 553, 560, 147 Idaho 444, 452 (2009). 
 37. Id. 




override a valid agreement. This standard also promotes the 
freedom to contract, which is a “fundamental concept underlying 
the law of contracts and is an essential element of the free en-
terprise system.” When faced with an action that could implicate 
both a contract and a statute, the contract will be the governing 
source of an attorney fee award.38 
At issue in Zenner was a contractual term providing for actual attorney 
fees (rather than “reasonable” attorney fees) to the prevailing party in 
an action to enforce the contract.39 Instead of applying Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(d), which provides for reasonable attorney fees, the 
Court held that the prevailing party was entitled to its actual attorney 
fees pursuant to the contract.40  
Finally, contractual terms that provide for attorney fees in favor of a 
party who successfully brings an action to enforce the contract will gen-
erally be awarded on appeal.41  
III. STATUTORY ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS BASED ON THE 
SUBSTANCE OF THE ACTION 
A. Commercial Transactions: Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) 
Idaho Code section 12-120(3) authorizes an award of attorney fees 
to the prevailing party42 in a claim arising from a commercial transac-
tion.43 Section 12-120(3) provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, 
note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating 
to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services 
and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by 
law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attor-
ney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as 
costs.44 
Commercial transactions are broadly defined in section 12-120(3) as “all 
transactions” except those for personal or household purposes.45  Com-
mercial transactions that have been deemed to fall under the purview of 
section 12-120(3) range from an industrial contract for the sale of 
wheat46 to an employer-employee contract.47 
                                                       
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See infra, Part II (discussing what constitutes a “prevailing party”). 
 43. IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3) (2015). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See generally Agrisource Inc. v. Johnson, 332 P.3d 815, 156 Idaho 903 (2014). 
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In order to invoke section 12-120(3), courts look to whether an as-
serted commercial transaction is the “gravamen” of the claim at issue.48 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that a “gravamen” of a claim is 
“the material or significant part of a grievance or complaint.” 49  In order 
to determine whether a commercial transaction at issue can be deemed 
the “gravamen” of a claim, courts look to whether the transaction is “in-
tegral” to the claim, and whether the transaction serves as “the basis of 
the party’s theory of recovery on that claim.”50  
When only one element of a larger, multi-element claim is commer-
cial in nature, relief is generally unavailable under section 12-120(3).51 
But in a suit involving multiple claims, a party may utilize section 12-
120(3) as a basis for an attorney fee award with respect to the individu-
al claims that meet the requirements of section 12-120(3).52 As the Ida-
ho Supreme Court recently explained in Sims v. Jacobson: 
This Court has stated that Idaho Code section 12-120(3) applies 
when “the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of 
the lawsuit.” However, we have interpreted that rule to require 
courts to consider the gravamen of each claim within the lawsuit 
. . . . When a lawsuit has multiple claims, courts look to each in-
dividual claim to determine what statutory basis allows attorney 
fee recovery on that claim. Thus, whether a party can recover at-
torney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3) depends on 
whether the gravamen of a claim is a commercial transaction. In 
other words, courts analyze the gravamen claim by claim.53 
Under the reasoning set forth in Sims, a party in a multi-claim suit can 
take heart if a commercial transaction underlies just one claim of many. 
As Sims illustrates, so long as the commercial transaction is the grava-
men of an individual claim, attorney fees are available under section 12-
120(3) (albeit with respect to that claim only).54 
A Commercial Transaction Triggering Section 12-120(3) Does 
Not Require an Actual Contract 
Although the term “commercial transaction” may carry connota-
tions of a transaction based on an actual contract, a party seeking attor-
ney fees under section 12-120(3) is not required to allege the existence of 
                                                                                                                                
 47. Sanders v. Bd. of Trs., 322 P.3d 1002, 1007, 156 Idaho 269, 274 (2014). 
 48. Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Nw. Pipeline Co., 36 P.3d 218, 224, 136 Idaho 466, 
472 (2001). 
 49. Sims v. Jacobson, 342 P.3d 907, 912, 157 Idaho 980, 985 (2015). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Farmers Nat’l Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 318 P.3d 622, 627, 155 Ida-
ho 853, 858 (2014) (holding that IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3) is not a source of attorney fees 
where only one element of a larger claim is commercial in nature). 
 52. Sims, 342 P.3d at 911–12, 157 Idaho at 984–85. 
 53. Id. (quoting Brower v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 792 P.2d 345, 349, 117 
Idaho 780, 784 (1990)). 
 54. Id.  




a contract.55 So long as the parties to the suit directly engaged in a 
transaction of a commercial nature, and so long as that transaction con-
stitutes the gravamen of the claim at issue, section 12-120(3) will apply 
regardless of whether or not a contract is alleged to exist.56  As the Ida-
ho Court of Appeals explained in Erickson v. Flynn: 
[T]he Idaho Supreme Court [has] declared that “Idaho Code § 
12-120(3) does not require that there be a contract between the 
parties before the statute is applied; the statute only requires 
that there be a commercial transaction.” We interpret this 
statement to mean that the term “commercial transaction” may 
extend beyond situations where a contract was formed.”57 
In Sims, the Idaho Supreme Court reiterated that an actual contract is 
not required to obtain an award of attorney fees under section 12-
120(3).58  The Sims Court held that attorney fees under 12-120(3) were 
available in a quantum meruit claims.59 The Court explained that 
“[q]uantum meruit is not a contract claim, but ‘Idaho Code § 12-120(3) 
does not require that there be a contract between the parties before the 
statute is applied.’”60 
A Commercial Transaction Triggering Section 12-120(3) Must Be 
Directly Between the Litigants 
While a commercial transaction for the purposes of section 12-
120(3) need not involve an actual contract, Idaho courts do require that 
the commercial transaction at issue be a transaction that actually oc-
curred between the litigating parties.61 A suit that arises between two 
parties based on a commercial transaction with a non-party will not 
trigger section 12-120(3).62 The Idaho Supreme Court illustrated this 
principle in Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corpora-
tion.63 In that case, subcontractors brought claims against a pipeline 
company after a general contractor went bankrupt.64 One of the subcon-
tractor’s claims was for unjust enrichment based on the subcontractor’s 
agreement with a contractor, and the contractor’s agreement with the 
pipeline company.65 The Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged that the 
                                                       
 55. See Great Plains Equip., 36 P.3d at 223, 136 Idaho at 471. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Erickson v. Flynn, 64 P.3d 959, 965, 138 Idaho 430, 436 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) 
(quoting Great Plains Equip., 36 P.3d at 224, 136 Idaho at 472). 
 58. Sims, 342 P.3d at 912, 157 Idaho at 985. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. (quoting Great Plains Equip., 36 P.3d at 224, 136 Idaho at 472). 
 61. Erickson, 64 P.3d at 966, 138 Idaho at 437. 
 62. Id.  
 63. See Great Plains Equip., 36 P.3d at 223, 136 Idaho at 471. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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unjust enrichment claim was commercial in nature.66 However, the 
Court denied the pipeline company an award of attorney fees because 
the gravamen of the suit was not a commercial transaction between the 
pipeline company and subcontractors, who were parties to the suit.67 
The Court noted that “[i]n this case, . . . the only commercial transaction 
took place between the respective subcontractor and [the general con-
tractor], and [the general contractor] and [the pipeline company].”68 As 
such, the parties to the suit were not directly involved in a commercial 
transaction. Thus, the prevailing party was not entitled to recover at-
torney fees under section 12-120(3).69 
The Mere Allegation of a Commercial Transaction is Sufficient to 
Trigger Idaho Code Section 12-120(3)—Proof of an Actual Com-
mercial Transaction is Not Required 
Importantly, section 12-120(3) is triggered by the allegation of a 
commercial transaction which constitutes the gravamen of a claim—not 
by the actual occurrence of a commercial transaction.70 Even where no 
actual commercial transaction has occurred between parties to a law-
suit, Idaho courts have repeatedly awarded attorney fees to prevailing 
party on the grounds that the losing party merely alleged a commercial 
transaction.71 An example of such a case is Garner v. Povey, where 
plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that their suit was a commercial 
transaction falling under the ambit of Idaho Code section 12-120(3).72 
Even though the Garner Court found that the suit did not involve a 
commercial transaction, the Idaho Supreme Court ultimately awarded 
attorney fees against the plaintiffs.73 The Court noted that “according to 
the Garners’ complaint, the gravamen of this action was a commercial 
transaction of the type embraced by Idaho Code § 12-120(3).”74 The 
Court also observed that a commercial transaction was “integral to the 
Garners’ claim and it was the basis upon which they sought to recov-
er.”75 The Court reaffirmed its position that where a party alleges either 
the existence of a contractual relationship or commercial transaction of 
a type contemplated by section 12-120(3), that allegation alone provides 
                                                       
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 224, 136 Idaho at 472. 
 69. Great Plains Equip., Inc., 36 P.3d at 224, 136 Idaho at 472. 
 70. See DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 331 P.3d 491, 499, 156 Idaho 749, 
757 (2014) (a party against whom attorney fees were sought had alleged a the existence of a 
commercial transaction, and when that party lost, court awarded attorney fee to other par-
ty); see also Intermountain Real Properties, LLC v. Draw, LLC, 311 P.3d 734, 741, 155 Idaho 
313, 320 (2013) (“[W]hen a plaintiff alleges a commercial contract exists and the defendant 
successfully defends by showing that the commercial contract never existed, the court 
awards the defendant attorney fees.”). 
 71. Id. 
 72. 259 P.3d 608, 617, 151 Idaho 462, 471 (2011).  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 




the basis for a claim for attorney fees under section 12-120(3), regard-
less of whether or not the contract or commercial transaction actually 
took place.76  
While this rule may seem counterintuitive, it is consistent with the 
language of section 12-120(3), which provides for attorney fees “in . . . 
actions to recover” based on commercial transactions.77 Since the lan-
guage of the statute emphasizes the grounds for recovery in the action 
itself, Section 12-120(3) is triggered by an allegation of a contract or 
commercial transaction rather than an ex-post factual finding that a 
contract or commercial transaction existed.78 
A Word of Caution: The Line Between Commercial Transaction 
and Those for “Personal or Household Purposes” Can Be Unclear 
As the language of Idaho Code section 12-120(3) makes clear, 
transactions for personal or household items do not fall under the ambit 
of section 12-120(3).79 For example, the Idaho Supreme Court has held 
that the refinancing of a plaintiff’s home did not constitute a “commer-
cial transaction” under Idaho Code section 12-120(3).80 This is a logical 
conclusion, since a transaction to refinance one’s home is quintessential-
ly a transaction for “personal or household purposes.”81  
Yet the distinction between commercial transactions which fall un-
der the purview of section 12-120(3) and those that do not can be a fine 
one.82 Idaho courts make precise distinctions in determining whether or 
not a commercial transaction for the purposes of section 12-120(3) is in-
tegral to a claim.83 In PHH Mortgage Services Corp. v. Perriera, a mort-
gage company bought a home at a foreclosure sale, and later brought 
suit to eject the residents of the home.84 The residents brought a coun-
terclaim to dispute the foreclosure sale of their home.85 The Idaho Su-
preme Court declined to award attorney fees, holding that a commercial 
transaction was not sufficiently integral to the parties’ dispute.86 How-
ever, in Taylor v. Just, the Court awarded attorney under Idaho Code 
section 12-120(3) where a plaintiff brought suit based on his attempt to 
bid on property during a foreclosure sale with the purpose of reselling 
                                                       
 76. Id.  
 77. IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3) (2015) (emphasis added). 
 78. Garner, 259 P.3d at 617, 151 Idaho at 471. 
 79. IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3). 
 80. Bajrektarevic v. Lighthouse Home Loans, Inc., 155 P.3d 691, 694, 143 Idaho 
890, 893 (2007). 
 81. IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3). 
 82. Id.  
 83. PHH Mortg. Services Corp. v. Perreira, 200 P.3d 1180, 1190, 146 Idaho 631, 641 
(2009). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.  
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it.87 Since the validity of the foreclosure sale was the central issue of the 
case, and since both parties agreed that the foreclosure sale was a com-
mercial transaction, the Court found that 12-120(3) provided for an 
award of attorney fees.88  
Upon first blush, the holdings in these cases may seem to conflict. 
But a closer look reveals that the holdings of PHH and Taylor are en-
tirely consistent with the language of section 12-120(3).89 In PHH, suit 
was brought to eject individuals from their home after a foreclosure sale, 
and the individuals counterclaimed to contest the validity of the foreclo-
sure sale.90 While a commercial transaction was involved—a foreclosure 
sale—the Court held that it was not the basis of the parties’ claim.91 
Conversely, in Taylor, where a foreclosure sale was also involved, the 
Court awarded attorney fees under section 12-120(3).92 But there, the 
gravamen of the claim was the validity of a foreclosure sale in which the 
buyer intended to resell the house rather than keep it for personal use, 
so an award of attorney fees was deemed proper under section 12-
120(3).93  
In sum, a party seeking an award of attorney’s fees under section 
12-120(3) should be aware that the application of section 12-120(3) will 
depend not upon whether a commercial transaction existed, but whether 
a party alleged that a commercial transaction existed in a complaint or 
counterclaim.94 In order to fully meet the requirements of section 12-
120(3), the heart of a claim or counterclaim must be a commercial 
transaction.95 A non-commercial claim that is simply related to a com-
mercial transaction will not withstand Idaho courts’ analysis of section 
12-120(3).96 
B. Actions Where Amount Pleaded is $35,000 or Less: Idaho Code 
Section 12-120(1) 
Whereas the provision discussed above—Idaho Code section 12-
120(3)—concerns civil actions involving commercial transactions, Idaho 
Code section 12-120(1) provides for fees in all types of civil actions as 
long as the amount pleaded does not exceed a specified amount.97 Until 
recently, Idaho Code section 12-120(1) provided for an award of fees 
                                                       
 87. Taylor v. Just, 59 P.3d 308, 313, 138 Idaho 137, 142 (2002). 
 88. Id. 
 89. IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3). 
 90. PHH Mortg. Services Corp., 200 P.3d at 1190, 146 Idaho at 641. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Taylor, 59 P.3d at 313, 138 Idaho at 142. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Garner, 259 P.3d at 617, 151 Idaho at 471. 
 95. Taylor, 59 P.3d at 312, 138 Idaho at 141. 
 96. PHH Mortg. Services Corp., 200 P.3d at 1190, 146 Idaho at 64. 
 97. IDAHO CODE  § 12-120(1) (2015). 




where the amount pleaded was $25,000 or less.98 Now Idaho Code sec-
tion 12-120(1) specifies a higher amount as the pleading ceiling: 
 [I]n any action where the amount pleaded is thirty-five thousand 
dollars ($35,000) or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the 
prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable 
amount to be fixed by the court as attorney's fees. For the plain-
tiff to be awarded attorney's fees, for the prosecution of the ac-
tion, written demand for the payment of such claim must have 
been made on the defendant not less than ten (10) days before 
the commencement of the action; provided, that no attorney's 
fees shall be allowed to the plaintiff if the court finds that the 
defendant tendered to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement 
of the action, an amount at least equal to ninety-five percent 
(95%) of the amount awarded to the plaintiff.99 
True to the express language of the statute, Idaho courts require parties 
to actually plead $35,000 or less of damages in order to successfully in-
voke section 12-120(1).100 This requirement is strictly construed, as the 
Idaho Supreme Court illustrated in Mickelsen v. Broadway Ford, Inc.: 
Mickelsen’s amended complaint prays for, among other things, 
both “[d]amages not in excess of $25,000” and “[r]ecission of the 
lease.” Rescission of the lease would result in cancelation of a 
debt owing on the lease and therefore must be included in the 
amount pleaded . . . since Mickelsen did not specifically allege 
that the total amount owing on the lease and the damages was 
$25,000 or less, the amended complaint did not specifically state 
that the total recovery sought was $25,000 dollars or less. There-
fore I.C. § 12-120(1) is not applicable.101 
Thus, a party seeking an award of attorney fees under this statute 
should be aware that even facially non-monetary claimed damages (such 
rescission of a lease, as in Mickelsen) can be considered by a court to de-
termine whether section 12-120(1) applies.  
When a plaintiff seeks an award of fees under this statute, she 
must provide to the defendant a demand for payment in writing at least 
ten days before the suit is commenced.102 The demand letter must in-
                                                       
 98. 2012 Idaho Sess. Laws 257. 
 99. IDAHO CODE § 12-120(1) (2015). 
100. Medical Recovery Servs., LLC v. Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc., 336 
P.3d 802, 809, 157 Idaho 395, 402 (2014).  
101. Mickelsen v. Broadway Ford, Inc., 280 P.3d 176, 183, 153 Idaho 149, 156 (2012). 
Mickelsen was decided before the Legislature amended the statutory pleading maximum 
under § 12-120(1) from $25,000 to $35,000.00.  2012 Idaho Sess. Laws 257. 
102. 2012 Idaho Sess. Laws 257. 
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clude the sum of money demanded.103 In Key Bank National Association 
v. PAL I, LLC, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a plaintiff’s demand 
letter which failed to include the sum of money sought did not fulfill the 
statutory requirements of section 12-120(1).104 
In order to avoid paying attorney fees, a defendant must tender to 
the plaintiff 95% of the amount ultimately awarded at trial.105 When 
these terms are met, a court must award attorney fees to the prevailing 
party.106 This fairly straightforward statute applies both at trial and on 
appeal.107  
C. Personal Injury Cases Where Claimed Damages Do Not Exceed 
$25,000: Idaho Code Section 12-120(4) 
Idaho Code section 12-120(4) authorizes courts to award attorney 
fees in personal injury actions.108 The section is limited to cases where 
the amount of a claimant’s alleged damages does not exceed $25,000.109  
The purpose of this provision is to facilitate “efficient and early settle-
ment” by influencing the bargaining power of parties to personal injury 
actions where a relatively modest amount is claimed.110 Section 12-
120(4) provides that: 
In actions for personal injury where the amount of plaintiff’s 
claim for damages does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars 
($25,000), there shall be taxed and allowed to the claimant, as 
part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed 
by the court as attorney’s fees. For the plaintiff to be awarded 
attorney’s fees for the prosecution of the action, written demand 
for payment of the claim and a statement of claim must have 
been served on the defendant’s insurer if known, or if there is no 
known insurer, than on defendant, not less than sixty (60) days 
before the commencement of the action; provided that no attor-
ney’s fees shall be awarded to the plaintiff if the court finds that 
the defendant tendered to the plaintiff, prior to the commence-
ment of the action, an amount at least equal to ninety percent 
(90%) of the amount awarded to plaintiff.111 
                                                       
103. Keybank Nat’l Ass’n v. PAL I, LLC, 311 P.3d 299, 309, 155 Idaho 287, 297 
(2013).  
104. Id. 
105. IDAHO CODE § 12-120(1) (2015). 
106. Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 225, 192 P.3d 1036, 1049 (2008). 
107. Id. 
108. IDAHO CODE § 12-120(4) (2015). 
109. Id. 
110. Gonzales v. Thacker, 231 P.3d 524, 528, 148 Idaho 879, 883 (2009).  
111. IDAHO CODE § 12-120(4) (2014) (emphasis added).  




The Idaho Supreme Court has held that Idaho Code section 12-120(4) is 
the exclusive source of attorney fee awards in personal injury actions 
where the amount of plaintiff’s claim does not exceed $25,000.112  
Section 12-120(4) allows for attorney fee awards only to plain-
tiffs.113 There has been some dispute over the years as to the meaning of 
“claimant” in the language of this provision.114 In 2003, the Idaho Court 
of Appeals decided Gillihan v. Gump (Gillihan I) holding that the legis-
lature’s choice the word “claimant”—rather than the term “prevailing 
party”—provides only successful plaintiffs in personal injury actions 
with an award of attorney fees.115 The next year, the Idaho Supreme 
Court reversed Gillihan I.116 In Gillihan II, the Idaho Supreme Court, 
by plurality opinion, held the word “claimant” in the provision could also 
refer to successful defendants in personal injury cases.117   
A few years later in Gonzales v. Thacker, the Idaho Supreme Court 
noted that because Gillihan II was a plurality opinion, it was not con-
trolling precedent.118  The Gonzales Court then examined the legislative 
history of Idaho Codes section 12-120(4).119  The Court explained that 
because the legislature had deleted the words “prevailing party” and 
replaced them with “claimant,” the legislature intended that Idaho Code 
section 12-120(4) apply only to plaintiffs in personal injury cases.120 
Generally, a plaintiff seeking an award of attorney fees under sec-
tion 12-120(4) must include all items of damages sought at trial in its 
original statement of claim.121 A statement of claim—not to be confused 
with a prayer for relief—is defined as “a written statement signed by the 
plaintiff’s attorney” and served on the defendant or the defendant’s in-
surer at least sixty days before commencement of the action.122 Under 
Idaho Code section 12-120(4), a statement of claim must include: 
(a) An itemized statement of each and every item of damage 
claimed by the plaintiff including the amount claimed for gen-
eral damages and the following items of special damages: (i) 
medical bills incurred up to the date of the plaintiff’s demand; 
(ii) a good faith estimate of future medical bills; (iii) lost income 
incurred up to the date of the plaintiff’s demand; (iv) a good faith 
                                                       
112. Gonzalez, 231 P.3d at 529, 148 Idaho at 884. 
113. Id. at 529, 148 Idaho at 883. 
114. Id. 
115. Gillihan v. Gump, 99 P.3d 1083, 1087 140 Idaho 693, 697 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003) 
rev’d, 92 P.3d 514, 140 Idaho 264 (2004). 
116. Gillihan v. Gump, 92 P.3d 514, 140 Idaho 264 (2004). 
117. Id. at 517, 140 Idaho at 267. 
118. Gonzalez, 231 P.3d at 529, 148 Idaho at 884. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. IDAHO CODE § 12-120(4) (2015). 
122. Id.  If the plaintiff is unrepresented, she must sign the statement herself.  
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estimate of future loss of income; and (v) property damage for 
which the plaintiff has not been paid. 
(b) Legible copies of all medical records, bills, and other docu-
mentation pertinent to the plaintiff’s alleged damages.123 
As a general rule, if the plaintiff includes in the complaint or in the evi-
dence at trial “a different alleged injury or a significant new item of 
damages that was not included in the plaintiff’s statement of claim,” she 
will “be deemed to have waived any entitlement to attorney’s fees” of the 
omitted injury or item of damage under Idaho Code section 12-120(4).124  
However, Idaho courts have allowed plaintiffs some leeway where 
insignificant items of damages are not disclosed in a statement of claim 
but are later introduced at trial.125 In Contreras v. Rubley, a trial court 
awarded attorney fees to a personal injury plaintiff under Idaho Code 
section 12-120(4), despite the fact that the plaintiff had introduced evi-
dence of property damages that had not been included in his original 
statement of claim.126 Specifically, the plaintiff had introduced evidence 
of $2,500 of property damage to his vehicle at trial, but had not included 
property damage to his vehicle in his statement of claim.127 On appeal, 
the Idaho Supreme Court found that though the claim for property 
damage was new, it was not significant enough in light of the total 
claimed amount to warrant a reversal of the trial court’s award of fees: 
Even though evidence of the property damage was new, it was 
not significant enough to constitute a waiver of Contreras’ right 
to attorney fees. Contreras’ original Statement of Claim to Ru-
bley’s insurer on June 18, 2002, sought $20,000 in damages. The 
insurer disclaimed liability for the accident and made no tender 
to respondents in an attempt to settle the case. We agree with 
the district court that the $2,500 car was not necessarily a sig-
nificant item of damage when compared to the $20,000 demand 
made in the Statement of Claim. As Rubley’s insurer disclaimed 
any liability by concluding that [another party] was 100% re-
sponsible for the accident, it is difficult to see how a lack of 
awareness of damage to the car played any part in Rubley’s in-
surer’s refusal to settle prior to the commencement of this suit. 
We affirm the district court’s award of attorney fees . . . .128 
Contreras suggests that the significance of an additional amount not 
originally set forth in a statement of claim will depend upon its propor-
tion to the overall claimed amount.  Where an additional amount is sig-
                                                       
123. Id. 
124. Id. 








nificantly less than a total claimed amount, the Contreras holding indi-
cates that a court may grant—or, in the case of appellate courts, subse-
quently uphold—an award of attorney fees that includes the additional 
amount.129  However, the language of Contreras suggests that if Contre-
ras’ statement of claim had been closer to the claimed amount of proper-
ty damage, the outcome may have been different.130  Thus, individuals 
seeking an award of fees under this statute would be wise to make sure 
that statements of claims are sufficiently detailed and contain all as-
serted items of damages.   
Courts have held that the pleadings themselves do not need to ex-
pressly claim less than $25,000, because the $25,000 applies only to the 
statement of claim.  Thus, a party whose pleading includes phrases such 
as “general damages in an amount to be proven at trial” or other non-
specific requests for relief does not waive her right to receive an award 
of attorney fees under 12-120(4).131  
D. Divorce Proceedings: Idaho Code Section 32-704 
In divorce actions, trial courts may grant attorney fees after con-
sidering the parties’ respective financial situations and other statutori-
ly-specified factors. Idaho Code section 32-704 provides that a trial court 
may “from time to time after considering the financial resources of both 
parties and the factors set forth in section 32-705, Idaho Code, order a 
party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party . . . and 
for attorney’s fees . . . .”132  
In considering whether the parties’ financial resources warrant an 
award of attorney fees, Idaho courts have found that a substantial in-
come disparity between the parties can be enough to support a finding 
that the party with the higher income ought to pay the other party’s at-
torney fees.133 However, even where there is some disparity between the 
parties’ incomes, a party who possesses the financial resources to prose-
cute or defend the action on her own may not be granted an award of 
attorney fees.134  The case law about the effect of income disparity in 
divorce proceedings is somewhat confusing, as the Idaho Court of Ap-
peals observed in Stephens v. Stephens: 
                                                       
129. Id. 
130. Id. (“[T]he $2,500 car was not necessarily a significant item of damage when 
compared with the $20,000 demand made in the Statement of Claim.”). 
131. See generally Cox v. Mulligan, 128 P.3d 893, 142 Idaho 356 (2005).  
132. IDAHO CODE § 32-704(3) (2006). 
133. Pieper v. Pieper, 873 P.2d 921, 925, 125 Idaho 667, 671 (Ct. App. 1994). 
134. See Jensen v. Jensen, 917 P.2d 757, 763, 128 Idaho 600, 606 (1996) (denying 
award of attorney fees to divorcing wife whose annual income was $79,000—even though her 
ex-husband’s income was $191,000—on the grounds that she could afford the fees); see also 
Perez v. Perez, 6 P.3d 411, 415, 134 Idaho 555, 559 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that an award of 
attorney fees is improper where party seeking fees has the financial resources to prosecute or 
defend the action). 
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There are Idaho appellate decisions stating that a disparity in 
the income of the parties is generally sufficient to justify an 
award of attorney fees under § 32-704. . . . Nevertheless . . . 
there are other Idaho cases which suggest that income inequali-
ty would not justify an award of the requesting party had suffi-
cient other financial resources to pay his or her attorney fees. In 
some of these cases, the courts held that an order granting at-
torney fees was unwarranted, based solely on the value of the 
marital property awarded to the spouse requesting the fees. . . . 
Nevertheless, we conclude that a spouse’s receipt of assets in the 
form of a property division sufficient to pay attorney fees does 
not necessarily preclude an award of attorney fees to that 
spouse. . . . Plainly, the current statute now mandates that 
courts in divorce proceedings consider elements beside necessity 
and the value of assets awarded in the property division in de-
ciding whether an award of attorney fees is appropriate.135 
In other words, there is no bright-line rule for how a party’s income will 
factor into a court’s decision whether or not to award attorney fees in a 
divorce proceeding.     
A trial court determining whether to award attorney fees in a di-
vorce action is directed under section 32-704 to consider the same fac-
tors used to determine whether or not spousal maintenance is appropri-
ate.136  These factors are set forth in Idaho Code section 32-705.137 In 
applying the factors, trial courts have broad discretion to consider a vast 
spectrum of facts, encompassing everything from the respective fault of 
the parties to the parties’ tax consequences.138 The list of factors—
which is not exclusive—should be read in its entirety to best understand 
trial courts’ broad discretion in awarding attorney fees in divorce pro-
ceedings:  
The maintenance ordered shall be in such amounts and such pe-
riods of time that the court deems just, after considering all rel-
evant factors which may include (a) The financial resources of 
the spouse seeking maintenance, including the marital property 
apportioned to said spouse, and said spouse’s ability to meet his 
or her needs independently; (b) The time necessary to acquire 
sufficient education and training to enable the spouse seeking 
                                                       
135. Stephens v. Stephens, 61 P.3d 63, 65, 138 Idaho 195, 198 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002).  
The Stephens Court was referring to a 1980 amendment to Idaho Code section 32-704, which 
was originally enacted in 1875.  The 1875 version of the statute fee awards were only appro-
priate when “necessary” to allow a divorcing wife to either initiate or defend in divorce pro-
ceedings. Idaho Terr. Sess. 1875, p. 639, § 7.   After the 1980 amendment, the statute no 
longer required strict necessity and instead, provided a multi-factor analysis. 1980 Idaho 
Sess. Law 962. 
136. Stephens, 61 P.3d at 64, 138 Idaho at 196. 
137. IDAHO CODE § 32-705(2) (2006); Stephens, 61 P.3d at 64, 138 Idaho at 196. 
138. IDAHO CODE § 32-705(2) (2006).  




maintenance to find employment; (c) The duration of the mar-
riage; (d) The age and physical and emotional condition of the 
spouse seeking maintenance; (e) The ability of the spouse from 
whom maintenance is sought to meet his or her needs while 
meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance; The tax con-
sequences to each spouse; [and] (g) The fault of either party.139 
The legislative intent behind this multi-factor analysis is to ensure that 
the parties’ respective needs—rather than their respective fault—
provide the primary basis for an award of maintenance or attorney’s 
fees.140  
In order to be upheld on appeal, a trial court’s decision granting at-
torney fees in a divorce action under section 32-704 must include an 
analysis of the factors set forth in section 32-705.141 A recent case in 
which the Idaho Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s award of attorney 
fees in a divorce illustrates the multi-factor analysis that must be shown 
for an award of attorney fees to withstand appallate scrutiny: 
In this case, the magistrate court extensively analyzed the fac-
tors listed in I.C. § 32-705, and cited to them prior to awarding 
Bertha attorney fees. The magistrate court specifically consid-
ered: Bertha’s inability to support herself, the longevity of the 
parties’ marriage and Bertha’s limited English skills, age, and 
lack of employment history. The court also considered the fact 
that Pedro would be able to adequately care for himself in light 
of the spousal maintenance award. Because the magistrate court 
properly considered and cited to the factors listed in I.C. 32-705, 
the district court did not err in affirming Bertha’s award of at-
torney fees.142 
As this brief discussion illustrates, Idaho courts have broad discre-
tion in determining whether to award attorney fees in divorce proceed-
ings. Yet a trial court judge awarding attorney fees to a party in a di-
vorce proceeding must apply the spousal maintenance factors set forth 
in §32-705 to ensure that the award of fees survives appeal.143 Thus, it 
may be prudent for a litigant in a divorce proceeding to apply the spous-
                                                       
139. Id. 
140. When first enacted, the statute providing for spousal support used a party’s 
fault or innocence as a determining factor in a trial court’s decision to award alimony.  How-
ever, in 1990 the legislature amended the statute with the intention of making the parties’ 
respective needs form the basis for an award of fees. 1990 Idaho Sess. Laws 917. 
141. Noble v. Fisher, 894 P.2d 118, 124, 126 Idaho 885, 891 (1995) (declining to up-
hold a trial court’s decision to award attorney fees where decision did not cite to section 32-
705, and noting that “prior decisions of this Court hold that in order to make an award of 
costs and attorney fees under section 32-704, the court must first consider and cite the fac-
tors listed in section 32-705 in its decision”). 
142. Pelayo v. Pelayo, 303 P.3d 214, 224, 154 Idaho 855, 865 (2013). 
143. Noble, 894 P.2d at 124, 126 Idaho at 891. 
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al maintenance factors to the facts of her case when seeking an award of 
attorney fees. 
E. Lien Foreclosure Proceedings Idaho Code Section 45-513 
Idaho Code section 45-513, enacted in 1893, mandates an award of 
attorney fees to a plaintiff who successfully brings an action to foreclose 
a lien.144 An award of attorney fees under this statute is automatic for a 
successful lien claimant.145 Only the amount of the fee award is within 
the trial court’s discretion.146 Because this provision is so narrow, 
broader code provisions for providing fee awards—such as Idaho Code 
section 12-120(3), which governs attorney fee awards in commercial 
transactions147—do not apply in a lien foreclosure actions.148  
The Idaho Supreme Court has long held that this code provision 
does not apply to a property owner who successfully defends an action 
brought by a lienholder.149 Thus, a defendant in a lien foreclosure action 
who seeks attorney fees would be well-advised to assert an alternative 
basis for an attorney fee award.150  
Idaho Code section 45-513 has been challenged on constitutional 
grounds,151 and on the grounds that it violates a public policy encourag-
ing settlement.152 These challenges have proven unsuccessful.153  
                                                       
144. IDAHO CODE § 45-513 (2014); see also Olsen v. Rowe, 873 P.2d 1340, 1342, 125 
Idaho 686, 688 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994). 
145. See Fairfax v. Ramirez, 982 P.2d 375, 381, 133 Idaho 72, 78 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1999) (noting that an award of attorney fees and costs in favor of successful lien claimant is 
mandatory, but that the amount of attorney fees is left to the court’s discretion). 
146. Id.  
147. See infra, Part IV.A. 
148. See Parkwest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 302 P.3d 18, 26, 154 Idaho 678, 686 
(Idaho 2013) (“[B]ecause section 45-513 is a specific statute providing for the award of attor-
ney fees in a proceedings to foreclose a mechanic’s lien, Idaho Code section[s] 12-120(3) and 
12-121, which are general statutes, do not apply.”) (quoting First Fed. Sav. Bank of Twin 
Falls v. Riedesel Eng’g, Inc., 301 P.3d 632, 638, 154 Idaho 626, 632 (Idaho 2012)). 
149. See L & W Supply Co. v. Chartrand Family Trust, 40 P.3d 98, 104, 196 Idaho 
738, 746 (2002) (“This Court has indicated that the section . . .  [does] not provide recovery of 
attorney fees for defendants.”). See also Thompson v. Wise Boy Mining & Milling Co., 74 P. 
958, 960, 9 Idaho 363, 363 (1903) (declining to construe Idaho Code section 45-513 as provid-
ing award of attorney fees to prevailing defendant, and noting that “the defendant in such 
cases is not prosecuting an action . . . and hence stands upon an entirely different principle 
from that of the party seeking to enforce his lien.”). 
150. See Fairfax, 982 P.2d at 381, 133 Idaho at 78. There, the Court of Appeals held 
that because section 45-513 did not apply on appeal, parties were not barred from seeking 
award of attorney fees under an alternative statute.  Since section 45-413 does not apply to 
defendants as a source of an award of attorney’s fees, it logically follows that that provision 
would not limit defendants’ rights to recover under other statutes.  For example, a defendant 
who believes he will prevail in a lien foreclosure action could assert that the plaintiff’s claim 
was brought unreasonably and invoke Idaho Code section 12-121. For more on section 12-
121, see infra Part V.A. See also supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
151. See Harrington v. McCarthy, 420 P.2d 790, 795, 91 Idaho 307, 312 (1966) [here-
inafter Harrington] (rejecting claim that statute violated Equal Protection Clause for sin-
gling out debtors as a class). 




It has also been asserted that this provision could give rise to an 
award of attorney fees for the preparation of the lien itself—a notion 
which the Idaho Supreme Court has rejected.154 The Court has distin-
guished an award based on the action to foreclose on a lien, which can 
provide the grounds for a fee award, from the time spent preparing a 
lien, which is not recoverable.155 However, in 1982, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals held that a stipulation to release a lien on the condition that 
the contractor receive compensation via a special fund was the “func-
tional equivalent” of a lien, and thus, the lienholder’s attorney was enti-
tled to attorney fees.156 In that case, the Court of Appeals also held that 
a lienholder may be awarded attorney fees where the amount due under 
a contract is ultimately found to be less than the lienholder originally 
claimed.157   
The most common misapplication of section 45-513 is a request for 
attorney fees on appeal.158 However, because the legislature deleted a 
provision of this statute that would have allowed for attorney fee awards 
on appeal, Idaho courts have long construed the statute as not providing 
for attorney fee awards on appeal.159  
F. Claims Arising Under Insurance Policies: 
Idaho Code Section 41-1839 
Idaho Code section 41-1839 provides for attorney fee awards in 
claims arising from insurance disputes.160 The Idaho Supreme Court 
has explained that section 41-1839 provides an incentive to insurers to 
settle justified claims so as to reduce the amount of insurance-related 
                                                                                                                                
152. See Elec. Wholesale Supply Co. v. Nielson, 41 P.3d 242, 253, 136 Idaho 814, 825 
(2001) (rejecting argument that statute violates public policy against encouraging settle-
ment).  
153. See id.; see also Harrington, 420 P.2d at 795, 91 Idaho at 312. 
154. See Pierson v. Sewell, 539 P.2d 590, 597, 97 Idaho 38, 45 (1975) (holding that 
lien claimant’s attorney was not entitled to fee award for time spent preparing lien). 
155. Id. 
156. See J.E.T. Dev. v. Dorsey Const. Co., Inc., 642 P.2d 954, 956, 102 Idaho 863, 865 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1982) (“The cross-claim, seeking to recover from the special account fund, 
was the functional equivalent of an action to foreclose the lien . . . . [Idaho Code section] 45-
513 was applicable to the cross-claim.”). 
157. Id. (holding that because “the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a reasonable 
attorney fee is an incident of foreclosure of [a] lien . . . [t]he lien itself is not rendered invalid 
merely because a claimant fails to prove the full amount of his original claim.”). 
158. See, e.g., Magleby v. Garn, 296 P.3d 400, 154 Idaho 194 (2013); Intermountain 
Real Properties, LLC v. Draw, LLC, 311 P.3d 734, 155 Idaho 313 (2013). 
159. See Intermountain Real Properties, 311 P.3d 734, 154 Idaho 194 (holding that 
Idaho Code section 45-513 does not provide for awards of attorney fees on appeal because the 
legislature deleted a provision that would have provided for attorney fee awards on appeal 
prior to adopting the statute). 
160. IDAHO CODE  § 41-1839 (2015). 
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litigation and its accompanying high costs.161 Section 41-1839 also aims 
to prevent the amount of money due to individuals under their insur-
ance policies from being reduced by the cost of retaining an attorney.162  
Section 41-1839 allows an insured individual to receive an award of 
attorney fees against an insurer who fails to pay the amount justly due 
under the insured’s policy of insurance within 30 days of the insured’s 
submission of proof of loss under the policy: 
(1) Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of in-
surance, surety, guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature 
whatsoever that fails to pay a person entitled thereto within 
thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished as provid-
ed in such policy, certificate or contract, or to pay to the person 
entitled thereto within sixty (60) days if the proof of loss per-
tains to uninsured motorist or underinsured motorist coverage 
benefits, the amount that person is justly due under such policy, 
certificate or contract shall in any action thereafter commenced 
against the insurer in any court in this state, or in any arbitra-
tion for recovery under the terms of the policy, certificate or con-
tract, pay such further amount as the court shall adjudge rea-
sonable as attorney's fees in such action or arbitration. 
(2) In any such action or arbitration, if it is alleged that before 
the commencement thereof, a tender of the full amount justly 
due was made to the person entitled thereto, and such amount is 
thereupon deposited in the court, and if the allegation is found 
to be true, or if it is determined in such action or arbitration that 
no amount is justly due, then no such attorney's fees may be re-
covered . . .  
(4)  Notwithstanding any other provision of statute to the con-
trary, this section and section 12-123, Idaho Code, shall provide 
the exclusive remedy for the award of statutory attorney’s fees 
in all actions or arbitrations between insureds and insurers in-
volving disputes arising under policies of insurance.  Provided, 
attorney’s fees may be awarded by the court when it finds, from 
the facts presented to it that a case was brought, pursued, or de-
fended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.163 
As explained above, a party seeking to collect the proceeds due under an 
insurance policy may only call upon Idaho Code sections 41-1839 and 
                                                       
161. Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 61 P.3d 601, 604, 138 Idaho 244, 247 
(2002). 
162. Walton v. Hartford Ins. Co., 818 P.2d 320, 324, 120 Idaho 616, 620 (1991) (over-
ruled on other grounds by Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut Ins. Co., 130 P.3d 1129, 142 Idaho 
589(2006)). 
163. IDAHO CODE § 41-1839 (2015). 




12-123 to obtain an award of attorney fees—no other attorney fee stat-
utes may be invoked.164  
Section 41-1839 did not always explicitly exclude other statutes 
from application to insurance cases.165  In 1995, the Idaho Supreme 
Court applied section 12-120(3), which governs attorney fee awards in 
commercial transactions, to an insurance case that would have other-
wise fallen under the purview of section 41-1839.166 In response, the 
legislature amended section 41-1839 in 1996 to provide that section 41-
1839 is the exclusive basis for a statutory award of attorney fees.167 The 
legislature explained its reasoning for the change in its statement of 
purpose: 
It has become necessary to amend Idaho Code Section 41-1839 . . 
. The purpose of this amendment to Idaho Code Section 41-1839 
is to . . . provide that Section 41-1839 is the exclusive attorneys’ 
fee statute that applies to insurance disputes, and to provide in-
centives for insurance companies to reach agreements with their 
insureds rather than initiating litigation against their insureds 
whenever a claim may be filed.168 
Idaho Code section 41-1839, as amended in 1996, expressly provided 
that attorney fee awards in insurances cases were not available under 
Idaho Code section 12-120.169 The same year, section 41-1839 was also 
amended so that subsection (4) would provide for an award of attorney 
fees under Idaho Code section 12-123,170 as well as to provide for an 
award of attorney fees where an action is “brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.”171 This change al-
lowed a party to invoke Idaho Code section 41-1839(4) where another 
party brings frivolous claims or engages in frivolous conduct, while up-
holding the legislative intent to protect insurers seeking to recover 
amounts due under their policies. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained how an insurer can avoid 
paying an insured’s attorney fees under the statute: 
In order to avoid liability for attorney fees, the insurance com-
pany must either: (a) pay the amount justly due to the person 
entitled within the thirty-day period, or (b) tender the amount 
justly due to the person thereto and thereupon deposit such 
                                                       
164. Id. 
165. 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws 1308. 
166. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Brady, 907 P.2d 807, 127 Idaho 830 (1995).  
167. 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws 1308.  
168. Id. 
169. Id.  
170. Id.  
171. Id.  
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amount in the court prior to the commencement of the law-
suit.172 
The Court has held that an insurance company does not “compensate” 
an insured for the purposes of this statute when the company mails a 
check with instructions not to cash it.173   
A party wishing to recover attorney fees under this statute must 
submit proof of loss to the insurance company within the parameters set 
forth in her insurance policy.174 The statutory 30-day period in which an 
insurance company must pay the policy amount begins only after the 
proof of loss is submitted.175 A party seeking to recover under this stat-
ute must also correctly cite the specific subsection of the statute under 
which the party wishes to recover.176 In Rogers v. Household Life Ins. 
Co., the Court declined to award fees when a party sought an attorney 
fee award and cited to 41-1839 without specifically naming subsection 
(4).177  
In order to get attorney fees under this statute, a party need only 
be awarded a higher amount of damages than the amount tendered by 
the insurance company.178 Parties to litigation governed by section 41-
1839 are not subject to the prevailing party analysis set forth under 
I.R.C.P. 54, because under the language of Idaho Code section 41-1839, 
“the court is not to compare the relief sought by insured with the result 
obtained”179 Even if an insured does not receive a verdict for the total 
amount she originally claimed, she may still receive an award of fees 
under section 41-1839 so long as she is awarded a verdict that exceeds 
the amount offered by the insurer.180  
G. Claims Arising Under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act: Idaho 
Code Section 48-608(5) 
Attorney fees are available to prevailing parties in actions brought 
pursuant to the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.181 This statute prohib-
its acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive in the course of trade or 
commerce within Idaho.182 The Act also forbids unfair competition.183 
Idaho Code section 48-608 specifically provides grounds for relief for 
parties aggrieved by a loss from purchase or lease of goods or ser-
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176. Rogers v. Household Life Ins. Co., 250 P.3d 786, 791, 150 Idaho 735, 740 (2011). 
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181. IDAHO CODE § 48-601-19 (2015). 
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vices.184 Idaho Code section 48-608 was amended in 2008.185 The 2008 
Amendment tacked on an extra penalty for unfair trade practices where 
the victim is elderly or disabled.186 
Section 48-608 contains a provision which allows for an award of 
fees for an aggrieved party who prevails in an action brought under the 
Idaho Consumer Protection Act: 
In any action brought by a person under this section, the court 
shall award, in addition to the relief provided in this section, 
reasonable attorney's fees to the plaintiff if he prevails. The 
court in its discretion may award attorney's fees to a prevailing 
defendant if it finds that the plaintiff's action is spurious or 
brought for harassment purposes only.187 
Taylor v. McNichols provides an example of a spurious claim brought by 
a plaintiff which resulted in an attorney fee award to a defendant.188 
There, a plaintiff who had not purchased or leased any goods or services 
brought suit under Idaho Code section 48-608, which provides relief for 
parties harmed by a loss sustained in the course of a purchase or lease 
of goods or services.189 Despite the fact that the plaintiff’s claim failed 
as a matter of law, he appealed.190 In affirming the trial court’s deci-
sion, the Idaho Supreme Court awarded fees to the original defendant in 
this action because the original plaintiff “appealed his ICPA claim de-
spite the fact that the claim clearly failed as a matter of law, and was 
brought spuriously for harassment purposes only.”191 The Court went 
on to state that the Taylor respondents were also “entitled to attorney 
fees under I.C. § 12-121 . . . as this appeal was brought spuriously and 
without foundation, for harassment purposes only.”192 This suggests 
that for Idaho Consumer Protection Action defendants, Idaho Code sec-
tion 48-608(5) may be interchangeable with Idaho Code section § 21-121, 
as both provide for fee awards for meritless and/or bad faith claims.193 
Idaho courts have construed the words “prevailing party” in section 
48-608 as giving rise to a strict requirement that courts utilize the pre-
vailing party analysis set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54.194 
In Israel v. Leachman, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld a district 
court’s determination that a party who prevailed on a claim under the 
                                                       
184. See generally IDAHO CODE  § 48-608 (2015). 
185. 2008 Idaho Sess. Laws 749. The attorney fee provision is now subsection (5) ra-
ther than subsection (4). 
186. Id. 
187. IDAHO CODE § 48-608(5) (2015). 
188. Taylor v. McNichols, 243 P.3d 642, 665, 149 Idaho 826, 849 (2010). 
189. Id.  
190. Id.  
191. Id.  
192. Id.  
193. See IDAHO CODE § 12-121 (2015); IDAHO CODE § 48-608(5) (2015). 
194. Israel v. Leachman, 72 P.3d 864, 867, 139 Idaho 24, 27 (2003). 
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Idaho Consumer Protection Act but lost on other claims brought in the 
same action was not entitled to attorney fees: 
The determination of the award of attorney fees under I.C. § 48-
608 is made through an application of the prevailing party anal-
ysis in [Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure] 54(d)(1)(b) . . . . The dis-
trict court first looked at the relief requested by the parties.  
Then, the district court reviewed the claims between the parties 
and found that the [Plaintiffs] “clearly prevailed on the decep-
tive practice under the Idaho Consumer protection Act.” The dis-
trict court went on to state [that the Defendants had prevailed 
on more claims than the Plaintiffs] . . . . 
. . . . 
The district court recognized that the issue of attorney fees was 
within its discretion and that the [Plaintiffs], if found to be the 
prevailing party, could be awarded attorney fees pursuant to 
I.C. § 48-608(4) . . . . The district court determined that each 
party prevailed in party and did not prevail in part and decided 
that each party should bear its own costs and fees. 195 
The Israel plaintiffs contended that the Court should adopt a standard 
other than the Rule 54 prevailing-party analysis to ensure that parties 
harmed under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act could receive an 
award of fees, even where the parties do not prevail on the whole of 
their action.196 The Court rejected this argument, explaining that it “de-
cline[d] to interfere with this determination by limiting the scope of in-
quiry available to trial courts in fulfilling their discretionary functions 
under the rule, except by the established test of whether an abuse of 
discretion has occurred.”197   
Aside from the nuances of the prevailing-party analysis described 
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IV. STATUTORY ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS BASED ON PARTY 
CONDUCT 
A. Frivolous Claims or Defenses: Idaho Code Section 12-121 
Idaho Code section 12-121 is generally construed to allow for attor-
ney fee awards only in cases where a party’s claim or defense is frivo-
lous.199 However, its language is deceptively broad: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's 
fees to the prevailing party or parties, provided that this section 
shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise 
provides for the award of attorney's fees. The term “party” or 
“parties” is defined to include any person, partnership, corpora-
tion, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or po-
litical subdivision thereof.200 
This broad language seemingly allows a judge to award reasonable at-
torney fees to prevailing parties in “any civil action.”201 However, the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure limit an award under § 12-121 to cases 
where the party against whom the award of fees is has “pursued or de-
fended [a claim or appeal] frivolously, unreasonably, or without founda-
tion.”202 Importantly, attorney fees under this statute are only available 
when the entirety of a party’s claim or defense is deemed frivolous or 
without foundation.203 This limitation also holds true for cases on ap-
peal.204 If a party presents even one legitimate issue—even when nes-
tled among several unreasonable arguments—an award under Idaho 
Code section 12-121 is improper.205 Furthermore, where an attorney 
seeks a fee award on the grounds of frivolous conduct distinct from the 
party’s claims or defenses, a fee award section 12-121 is also improp-
                                                       
199. Idaho R. Civ. P. 54. 
200. IDAHO CODE § 12-121 (2015); see also IDAHO R. CIV. P. 54 (setting forth an anal-
ysis of what constitutes a “prevailing party”). 
201. IDAHO CODE  § 12-121 (2015). 
202. IDAHO R. CIV. P. 54; Telford Lands LLC v. Cain, 303 P.3d 1237, 1249, 154 Idaho 
981, 993 (Idaho 2013) (holding that application of section 12-121 is limited by Rule 54 to 
circumstances where a matter is brought or defended “frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation.”). But c.f. infra, Part VII. 
203. Bremer, LLC v. East Greenacres, 316 P.3d 652, 661, 155 Idaho 736, 745 (2014). 
204. Id. (holding that an award of attorney fees on appeal is only property when the 
Court is “left with abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued, or defended frivolous-
ly, unreasonably, or without foundation.”) (quoting Telford Lands LLC, 303 P.3d at 1249, 154 
Idaho at 993 (2013)). 
205. Id; see also Coward v. Hadley, 246 P.3d 391, 398–99, 150 Idaho 282, 289 (2010) 
(holding that where a party or parties present multiple claims, “the entire course of the liti-
gation must be taken into account, and if there is at least one legitimate issue presented, 
attorney fees may not be awarded even though the losing party has asserted other factual or 
legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”) (quoting Michalk v. 
Michalk, 220 P.3d 580, 591, 148 Idaho 224, 235 (2009)). 
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er.206 Instead, attorney fee awards based on frivolous conduct fall under 
the purview of Idaho Code section 12-123.207 Attorney fees under this 
statute are not available to a party who has prevailed due to a default 
judgment.208  
B. Frivolous Conduct at the Trial Court Level:Idaho Code Section 12-
123 
Unlike Idaho Code section 12-121—which allows for attorney fees 
only when the entirety of a party’s position on a matter is unreasona-
ble209—Idaho Code section 12-123 permits trial courts to award attor-
ney’s fees against an opposing party for engaging in frivolous conduct:  
[A]t any time prior to the commencement of the trial in a civil 
action or within twenty-one (21) days after the entry of judg-
ment in a civil action, the court may award reasonable attor-
ney's fees to any party to that action adversely affected by frivo-
lous conduct.210 
The statute broadly defines “conduct” as “filing a civil action, asserting a 
claim, defense, or other position in connection with a civil action, or tak-
ing any other action in connection with a civil action.”211 “Frivolous con-
duct” is defined in subsection 12-123(1)(b) as follows: 
“Frivolous conduct” means conduct of a party to a civil action or 
of his counsel of record that satisfies either of the following: (i) It 
obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another 
party to the civil action; (ii) It is not supported in fact or war-
ranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good 
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of ex-
isting law.212   
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that conduct is frivolous when it 
serves to either harass or injure a party, or where it is not supported by 
                                                       
206. Tapadeera, LLC v. Knowlton, 280 P.3d 685, 691, 153 Idaho 182, 188 (Idaho 
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fact or a good faith argument in law.213 Attorney fees may be awarded 
under this statute against a party or the offending party’s attorney.214 
Section 12-123(b) sets forth specific procedural requirements that 
must be met in order for a party to obtain an award of attorney fees: 
An award of reasonable attorney’s fees may be made by the 
court upon the motion of a party to a civil action, but only after 
the court does the following: (i) Sets a date for a hearing to de-
termine whether particular conduct was frivolous; and (ii) Gives 
notice of the date of the hearing to each party or counsel of rec-
ord who allegedly engaged in frivolous conduct and to each party 
allegedly adversely affected by frivolous conduct; and (iii) Con-
ducts the hearing to determine if the conduct was frivolous, 
whether any party was adversely affected by the conduct if it 
found to be frivolous, and to determine if an award is to be, the 
amount of that award. In connection with the hearing, the court 
may order each party who may be awarded reasonable attor-
ney’s fees and his counsel of record to submit to the court, for 
consideration in determining the amount of any such award, an 
itemized list of the legal services necessitated by the alleged 
frivolous conduct, the time expended in rendering the services, 
and the attorney’s fees associated with those services.215 
The procedural requirements set forth in section 12-123 cannot be skirt-
ed.216 In Roe Family Services v. Doe, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed 
a district court judge’s decision to award attorney fees as a sanction for 
frivolous conduct.217 The Idaho Supreme Court reversed, because “there 
is a specific procedure set forth in the statute requiring a motion by a 
party and notice and a hearing. None of these procedures took place in 
the instant case, and thus, the award of fees was improper.”218  
Unlike many of Idaho’s fee-shifting statutes, a party does not have 
to prevail to be granted an award of attorney’s fees under section 12-
123.219  However, section 12-123 cannot be invoked on appeal.220 Since 
a party invoking section 12-123 to obtain attorney fees must do so with-
in 21 days after the entry of judgment at the trial-court level,221 this 
section simply does apply to attorney fee awards on appeal.222  
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C. Frivolous Claim or Defense in Cases Involving Governmental 
Entities: Idaho Code Section 12-117 
Idaho Code section 12-117 provides for attorney fee awards in pro-
ceedings between persons and state agencies or political subdivisions 
when a non-prevailing party acts without a reasonable legal or factual 
basis.223 As enacted in 1984, section 12-117 originally provided for at-
torney fee awards for persons who prevail against state agencies or po-
litical subdivisions.224  However, in 2000, section 12-117 was amended 
so that attorney fee awards would also be available to state agencies 
who have to defend against claims that do not have a reasonable legal or 
factual basis.225  
In order to obtain an award of attorney fees under section 12-117, 
the party seeking an award of attorney fees must be the prevailing par-
ty, and the losing party must have acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law.226 The fact that attorney fees are requested in a suit involv-
ing a state agency or political subdivision does not automatically trigger 
section 12-117.227 The Idaho Supreme Court recently held that section 
12-117 is not the exclusive basis for attorney fee awards in suits involv-
ing governmental entities.228 
Idaho Code section 12-117 has been a source of much discussion 
over the past few years, primarily due to ambiguity surrounding the ex-
tent to which attorney fees may be awarded based on administrative 
proceedings.229 In order to give context to the statutory and interpretive 
evolution of section 12-117, it may be useful to briefly review the histori-
cal interpretation of the statute since its inception in 1984.230  
As originally enacted in 1984, section 12-117 provided that: 
In any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as 
adverse parties a state agency and a person, the court shall 
                                                                                                                                
688, 695 (2010) (holding that section 12-123 does not provide grounds for an award of attor-
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award the person reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and 
reasonable expenses, if the court finds in favor of the person and 
also finds that the state agency acted without a reasonable basis 
in fact or law.231 
In 1984, the Idaho Supreme Court decided Bogner v. State Department 
of Revenue Taxation, where the Court applied section 12-121 to award 
attorney fees against an administrative agency.232  The Court found 
support of its application of section 12-121 in the existence of then-
newly-enacted section 12-117, which the Court interpreted to provide for 
awards of attorney fees based on administrative proceedings.233 Howev-
er, the Bogner Court did not explicitly apply section 12-117 as a sub-
stantive basis for awarding attorney fees.234 
A few years later, the Court decided Stewart v. Department of 
Health and Welfare.235 There, the Court directly applied section 12-117, 
and expressly held that this section allowed for an award of attorney 
fees to a prevailing party in an administrative proceeding when the los-
ing state agency took a position that had no reasonable legal or factual 
basis.236 
In 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court overruled Stewart in Rammell v. 
Idaho State Department of Agriculture.237 The Rammell Court deter-
mined that the language of section 12-117 did not provide the authority 
for administrative agencies to award attorney fees.238 The Rammell 
Court further explained that the only way a party to an administrative 
proceeding could get an award of attorney fees was through the course 
of a judicial appeal of an administrative determination.239  
In response to Rammell, the Idaho legislature amended section 12-
117 with retroactive effect to restore the interpretation of section 12-117 
to its pre-Rammell state.240 As amended in 2010, section 12-117 would 
continue to provide attorney fee awards in administrative proceed-
ings.241 After the 2010 amendment, section 12-117 provided that: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative 
proceeding or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse par-
ties a state agency or political subdivision and a person, the 
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state agency or political subdivision or the court, as the case 
may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s 
fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that 
the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact 
or law.242 
Later in 2010, Idaho Supreme Court decided Smith v. Washington 
County, where the Court denied attorney fees to a party who appealed 
an administrative decision.243 The Smith Court reasoned that as 
amended, the plain language of section 12-117 no longer allowed for an 
award of attorney fees during a judicial appeal of an administrative 
agency decision: 
[A]s amended, I.C. § 12-117 does not allow a court to award at-
torney fees in an appeal from an administrative decision . . . It 
empowers only “the state agency or political subdivision, or the 
court, as the case may be, to award the fees . . . . [N]o mecha-
nism exists for courts to intervene in administrative proceedings 
to award attorney fees. By using the phrase “as the case may 
be,” the Legislature indicated that only the relevant adjudicative 
body—the agency in an administrative proceeding or the court 
in a judicial proceeding—may award that attorney fees.244 
In 2012, the Legislature again amended section 12-117 with unambigu-
ous language providing for attorney fee awards during judicial appeals 
of administrative determinations: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involv-
ing as adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision 
and a person, the state agency, political subdivision, or the court 
hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the 
prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees, witness fees and 
other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing par-
ty acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.245 
The 2012 amendment remains in force today.246 Last year in Flying “A” 
Ranch, Inc. v. County Commissioners of Freemont County, the Idaho Su-
preme Court awarded attorney fees to a party who prevailed on appeal 
from an administrative proceeding.247 The Court described the purpose 
of section 12-117 and its relation to administrative proceedings: “The 
dual purpose of I.C. § 12-117 is to (1) deter groundless or arbitrary 
agency action; and (2) to provide ‘a remedy for persons who have borne 
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an unfair and unjustified financial burden attempting to correct mis-
takes agencies should never have made.’”248 It thus appears that Idaho 
courts now recognize section 12-117 as providing for attorney fees in 
administrative proceedings, and through judicial appeals of such pro-
ceedings.249  
D. Frivolous Claims Relating to Public Records Requests: Idaho Code 
Section 9-344(2) 
Under Idaho law, a party who is denied a request to examine or 
copy public records may bring an action to compel the release of the rec-
ords under the Public Records Act.250 In these actions, an infrequently-
cited Idaho Code provision—section 9-344(2)—provides that a prevailing 
party will be awarded “reasonable costs and attorney fees” if the court 
finds that the request for documents, or the refusal to provide the docu-
ments, was frivolous.251  
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that section 9-344(2) provides 
the sole basis for an awards of attorney fees based on actions brought 
under the Public Records Act.252 In Henry v. Taylor, the Court ex-
plained why this narrower statute applies to the exclusion of broader 
statutes: 
To base an award on some other statute would be contrary to 
the legislature’s intent in including in the Act an attorney fee 
provision with a specified standard for awarding attorney fees in 
proceedings to enforce compliance with the Act. That statute is 
the exclusive bases for such an award.253 
Thus, even though Idaho Code statute 12-117 provides for attorney fee 
awards in certain claims against government entities,254 that provision 
gives way to the narrower constraints of Idaho Code section 9-344(2).255 
There is little else to be said about this particular provision as it is rare-
ly comes up in cases.256  
                                                       
248. Id. (quoting Fuchs v. Idaho State Police, Alcohol Beverage Control, 279 P.3d 
100, 103, 153 Idaho 114, 117 (2012). 
249. Id. 
250. IDAHO CODE § 9-343 (2014), repealed by 2015 Idaho Sess. Laws 363, codified at 
IDAHO CODE § 74-115 (2015).  
251. See IDAHO CODE § 9-344(2) (2014), repealed by 2015, Idaho Sess. Laws 361.  
252. Henry v. Taylor, 267 P.3d 1270, 1277, 152 Idaho 155, 162 (2011). 
253. Id. 
254. IDAHO CODE § 12-117 (2014). 
255. Hymas v. Meridian Police Dep’t, 330 P.3d 1097, 1106, 156 Idaho 739, 748 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 2014). 
256. For two examples of the relatively straightforward application of this rule, see 
Wade v. Taylor, 320 P.3d 1250, 1261, 156 Idaho 91, 102 (2014); see also Henry, 267 P.3d at 
1277, 152 Idaho at 162. 
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E. Frivolous Habeas Claims: Idaho Code Section 12-122 
Idaho Code section 12-122 allows a court to award attorney fee 
awards against prison or jail inmates who bring frivolous habeas 
claims.257 Section 12-122 provides: 
In any habeas corpus Action brought by a state penitentiary or 
county jail inmate, the judge shall award reasonable attorney’s 
fees to the respondent, if . . . the habeas corpus action was 
brought frivolously by the petitioner.258 
In order for a claim to be “brought frivolously” under this section, a peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus must be “based upon claims which either 
had no basis in fact, or even if the allegations were true, they did not 
[legally] justify any relief to the petitioner.”259  
The fact that a petition is dismissed for failure to state a claim up-
on which relief could be granted does not automatically render the claim 
frivolous.260  A court hearing the petition must apply the frivolity test, 
which asks whether the non-prevailing party took a position that is 
“plainly fallacious and, therefore, not fairly debatable.”261 A court may 
make a discretionary determination that an action is not frivolous 
where it involves “a material issue of law that has not been settled by 
statute or by a Supreme Court decision in this state.”262 In Drennan v. 
Craven, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a petitioner who set forth 
issues of unsettled law did not have to pay the state’s attorney fees.263 
The Drennan Court noted that attorney fee awards against habeas peti-
tioners who present matters of unsettled law would “not be appropriate” 
under section 12-122.264  
F. Bad Faith in Tort Claims against Governmental Entities: Idaho Code 
Section 6-918A 
Section 6-918A of the Idaho Tort Claims Act provides trial courts 
with discretion to award attorney fees against parties who bring or de-
fend tort claims in bad faith.265 Section 6-918A provides: 
                                                       
257. IDAHO CODE § 12-122 (2014). 
258. Id. 
259. Id.  
260. Dopp v. Idaho Comm’n on Pardons & Parole, 84 P.3d 593, 599, 139 Idaho 657, 
663 (Idaho Ct. App. 2004). 
261. Id. 
262. Id.  
263. Drennan v. Craven, 105 P.3d 694, 700, 141 Idaho 34, 40 (Idaho Ct. App. 2004) 
(“Because [petitioner] has presented material issues of unsettled law in this appeal and has 
prevailed in part on the appeal, attorney fees would not be appropriate under I.C. § 12-122 . . 
. . We therefore deny [Respondent]’s request for attorney fees. . .”). 
264. Id. 
265. IDAHO CODE § 6-918A (2015).  




At the time and in the manner provided for fixing costs in civil 
actions, and at the discretion of the trial court, appropriate and 
reasonable attorney fees may be awarded to the claimant, the 
governmental entity or the employee of such governmental enti-
ty, as costs, in actions under this act, upon petition therefor and 
a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the party 
against whom or which such award is sought was guilty of bad 
faith in the commencement, conduct, maintenance or defense of 
the action. In no case shall such attorney fee award or any com-
bination or total of such awards, together with other costs and 
money judgment or judgments for damages exceed, in the aggre-
gate, the limitations on liability fixed by section 6-926, Idaho 
Code. The right to recover attorney fees in legal actions for mon-
ey damages that come within the purview of this act shall be 
governed exclusively by the provisions of this act and not by any 
other statute or rule of the court, except as may be hereafter ex-
pressly and specifically provided or authorized by duly enacted 
statute of the state of Idaho.266 
A party seeking an award of attorney fees under the Idaho Tort Claims 
Act must demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the other 
party proceeded in bad faith.267  
Section 6-918A’s requirement of proof of bad faith by clear and con-
vincing evidence is considerably more onerous than the standard set 
forth in Idaho Code section 12-117, which provides for an attorney fee 
award against a nonprevailing party who acts “without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law” in suits involving governmental entities.268 Howev-
er, section 12-117 is not available to parties who bring claims under the 
Idaho Tort Claims Act.269 Last year, the Idaho Supreme Court decided 
Block v. City of Lewiston, where a party who brought suit against the 
City of Lewiston under the Idaho Tort Claims Act.270 Lewiston sought 
an award of attorney fees under sections 12-117 and 6-918A.271 Despite 
the fact that Idaho Code section 12-117 was enacted after the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act, the Court held that the enactment of section 12-117 did not 
create an exception to section 6-918A.272 The Block Court explained its 
reasoning: 
Because I.C. § 12-117 was enacted after I.C. § 6-918A, the ques-
tion is whether its language provides sufficiently express and 
specific exception to the exclusive scope of § 6-918A. 
                                                       
266. Id. 
267. Id.  
268. IDAHO CODE § 12-117 (2015). See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
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 . . . .  
We have held that section 12-117’s “[u]nless otherwise provided 
by statute” language allows that when “another statute express-
ly provides for the awarding of attorney fees against a state 
agency or political subdivision, attorney fees can be awarded 
under that statute also.” While this language does not make I.C. 
§ 12-117 the exclusive means of awarding attorney fees against 
a state agency, it also does not indicate a specific an express in-
tent to provide an exception to I.C. §6-918A’s exclusive scope. 
Rather, this language indicates that where another statute pro-
vides the exclusive means for awarding attorney fees, I.C. § 12-
117 is not an exception to exclusivity. Therefore, I.C. § 6-918A is 
the exclusive means to award attorney fees to Lewiston in this 
case.273 
Thus, section 12-117 does not provide for an award of attorney fees if 
brought against governmental entities under the Idaho Tort Claims 
Act.274 
Idaho courts define bad faith as “dishonesty in belief or pur-
pose.”275 In order to demonstrate an opposing party’s bad faith, a party 
must demonstrate an “instance of dishonesty in belief or purpose on the 
part of” the opposing party.276 A party’s appeal which merely second-
guesses the findings of a trial court does not, without more, rise to the 
level of bad faith.277 Thus, parties seeking an award of attorney fees 
under section 6-918A should state a specific factual basis for an allega-
tion of bad faith.278 
V. ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS BASED ON PROCEDURAL RULES 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide numerous mecha-
nisms by which a court can sanction a party or her attorney for improp-
er conduct.279 Some are more heavily utilized than others, and covering 
all of them in depth would be beyond the scope of this Article.280 This 
                                                       
273. Id. (footnote omitted). 
274. Id. 
275. Cobbley v. City of Challis, 139 P.3d 732, 737, 143 Idaho 130, 135 (2006). 
276. Renzo v. Idaho State Dep’t. of Agr., 241 P.3d 950, 954, 149 Idaho 777, 782 
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Block’s part by clear and convincing evidence . . . . Because Lewiston has not shown by clear 
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ney fails to obey a scheduling or pre-trial order); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56(g) (attorney fee awards 
where affidavits submitted in bad faith); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 68 (attorney fee award where 
 




Section discusses two broad instances where the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure may be invoked to provide an award of attorney fees: as a 
sanction for misconduct when parties do not comply with various dis-
covery process requirements,281 and where parties engage in improper 
conduct filing documents with the court during trial proceedings or on 
appeal.  
A. Abuses of the Discovery Process: Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide for attorney fee awards 
as a sanction for a wide array of discovery abuses.282 Each subsection 
providing for an attorney fee award based on party conduct during the 
discovery process will be dealt with in turn. 
1. Attorney Fees Incurred in Bringing or Defending A Motion to Compel 
Sometimes during the discovery process, an opposing party may 
fail to comply with a discovery request. When this happens, the party 
who made the request may be forced to bring a motion to compel against 
the uncooperative party in order to keep the discovery process moving 
forward.283  However, as elsewhere in the litigation process, a motion to 
compel may be brought where it is not warranted.284 Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37(a) subsections (2) and (4) provide for attorney fees both in 
favor of a party who successfully brings a motion to compel discovery, 
and in favor of a party who successfully defends against a motion to 
compel discovery: 
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded 
or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other enti-
ty fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a 
party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, 
or if a party, in response to request for inspection submitted un-
der Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as 
requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the discov-
ering party may move for an order compelling an answer, or a 
designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance 
with the request. The motion must include a certification that 
                                                                                                                                
plaintiff refuses to take defendant’s reasonable settlement offer); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 65(c) (at-
torney fee awards in temporary restraining order and injunction proceedings). 
281. The author would like to thank Professor John Rumel for suggesting that this 
Article discuss attorney fees as a sanction for failure to comply with discovery rules.  
282. See generally IDAHO .R. CIV. P. 37; see also IDAHO .R. CIV. P. 30(d), (g). 
283. Appellate cases dealing with attorney fee awards for and against parties who 
bring motions to compel are few and far between, probably because discovery issues are un-
likely to make it to an appellate court.  
284. See generally Crown v. State Dep’t. of Agric., 898 P.2d 1086, 127 Idaho 175 
(1995) (upholding a district court’s award of attorney fees to a party who successfully defend-
ed against a motion to compel). 
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the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer 
with the party not making the disclosure in an effort to secure 
the disclosure without court action. When taking a deposition on 
oral examination, the proponent of the question may complete or 
adjourn the examination before he applies for an order. . . . 
(4) Award of Expenses of Motion. If the motion is granted, the 
court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or 
deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or 
attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the 
moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the 
order, including attorney’s fees, unless the court finds that the 
opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. If the motion 
is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require 
the moving party or the attorney advising the moving party or 
both of them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the 
motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, 
including attorney’s fees, unless the court finds that the making 
of the motion was substantially justified or that other circum-
stances make an award of expenses just.285 
A party cannot obtain an award of attorney fees under subsection (a) 
unless the party actually files a motion to compel.286 In Morgan v. De-
mos, heard by the Idaho Supreme Court last year, a party sought attor-
ney fees under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a) based upon an oppos-
ing party’s failure to respond to interrogatories.287  However, the party 
seeking an award of attorney fees had not filed a motion to compel dis-
covery.288 The Court denied the litigant attorney fees because he “never 
complied with the predicate provisions of Rule 37(a)(2),” which is to file 
a motion to compel discovery.289 Thus, no matter how uncooperative the 
opposing party, a litigant who wishes to obtain an award of attorney 
fees under 37(b)(2) must, as a threshold matter, actually file a motion to 
compel discovery.290 
The language of Rule 37(a)(4) limits recovery to expenses incurred 
in successfully bringing or defending a motion to compel discovery.291 
Such expenses occur before a court grants or denies a motion to compel, 
and should be distinguished from a party’s failure to comply with a 
court’s order compelling discovery, which falls under the purview of 
Rule 37(b). Rule 37(a)(4) limits a court’s discretion by providing a pre-
sumptive award of attorney fees “unless” factors enumerated in the rule 
                                                       
285. IDAHO .R. CIV. P. 37(a)(2) & (4). 
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are present.292 The Court articulated the narrow discretion afforded to 
trial courts under Rule 37(a) in Crown v. State, Department of Agricul-
ture: 
The district court’s decision to award sanctions for the growers’ 
improper discovery litigation is reviewed only for an abuse of 
discretion. As the district court was clearly aware, the scope of 
discretion afforded under the “shall . . . unless” scheme of 
I.R.C.P. 37(a)(4) is very limited. Accordingly, by analyzing the 
merits of the growers’ arguments within that framework, the 
district court sufficiently articulated an understanding of the 
bounds of its discretion . . . . And, because the court acted well 
within those boundaries, we will not disturb the award of sanc-
tions.293 
The “shall . . . unless” directive set forth in Rule 37 creates a strong pre-
sumption in favor of awarding attorney fees to a party who successfully 
brings or defends a motion to compel discovery.294 That presumption is 
a likely reason why few litigants seem to appeal trial court awards of 
attorney fees under Rule 37 and its various subsections. 
2. Attorney Fees Incurred by an Opposing Party’s Failure to Comply 
with a Discovery Order 
Unlike Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a), which is limited to ex-
penses incurred in bringing or defending against a motion to compel dis-
covery, Rule 37(b)(2) allows a court to award attorney fees incurred by 
an opposing party’s failure to comply with discovery orders: 
Sanctions by Court in Which Action is Pending. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person desig-
nated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party 
fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including 
an order made under subdivision (a) of this Rule or Rule 35, the 
court in which the action is pending may make such orders in 
regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following: 
[the Rule goes on to identify several orders courts can make] . . . 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the 
court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the at-
torney advising the party or both to pay the reasonable expens-
es, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the 
                                                       
292. Idaho .R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). 
293. Crown v. State Dep’t of Agric., 898 P.2d 1086, 1092, 127 Idaho 175, 181 (1995). 
294. See id. 
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court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that 
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.295 
As was the case with subsection (a) of Rule 37, there is little case law 
interpreting subsection (b). However, a 2004 case decided by the Idaho 
Court of Appeals illustrates the application of Rule 37(b).296 In 
Nepanuseno v. Hansen, the Court of Appeals sanctioned an attorney for 
failure to comply with a discovery order, despite the attorney’s unusual 
defense for the violation: 
[Plaintiff] also contends that the district court erred in awarding 
sanctions against his counsel for failure to comply with the 
court’s pretrial order. The pretrial order set a deadline for dis-
closure of all experts one hundred fifty days prior to the May 7, 
2002 trial date, or December 7, 2001. [Plaintiff] did not disclose 
his two expert witnesses, however, until February 2002. After 
[Plaintiff]’s late disclosure, [Defendant] filed a motion to strike 
the experts’ testimony as sanctions for the untimely disclosure. 
In response, [Plaintiff]’s attorney, Richard Vance, represented 
that he suffered from severe dyslexia, which caused him to 
“mentally interpose the first week of May, the fifth month, with 
the last week of July, the seventh month,” thereby incorrectly 
calendaring the trial date and the resulting deadlines. In ad-
dressing [Defendant]’s motion, the trial court noted that Vance 
presented no proof, by affidavit of a medical doctor or otherwise, 
to support his allegation of dyslexia. Although it was in the 
court’s discretion to strike [Plaintiff]’s expert witnesses . . . the 
court determined that such a sanction would be unfair to [Plain-
tiff], who was not responsible for his counsel’s failure to meet 
deadlines. The court also found that monetary sanctions against 
Vance were appropriate . . . .[the trial court ordered] Vance to 
pay [Defendant]’s attorney fees for preparation of [Defendant]’s 
motion to strike and an associated motion for summary judg-
ment . . . . Therefore, the award of attorney fees against [Vance], 
as a sanction for  violation of the court’s pretrial discovery order, 
is affirmed.297  
Though the Napanuseno decision illustrates the application of Rule 
37(b), few other appellate court cases are available, likely due to the 
“shall award . . . unless” directive in subsection (b) and elsewhere in 
Rule 37. The strong presumption of an award of attorney fees created by 
the language in Rule 37 likely deters appeals of pre-trial orders under 
this rule. 
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In extreme circumstances, a trial court may go further and simply 
dismiss a case with prejudice for a party’s failure to comply with discov-
ery orders.298  However, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that dismis-
sals with prejudice under Rule 37(b) must be warranted by a “clear 
showing of delay and the ineffectiveness of lesser sanctions.”299 Addi-
tionally, the dismissal with prejudice must be “bolstered by the presence 
of at least one aggravating factor.”300 Such aggravating factors may in-
clude intentional conduct resulting in delay, delay caused by the plain-
tiff individually, and/or delay which cases prejudice to the defendant.301  
3. Attorney Fees Incurred by an Opposing Party’s Failure to Admit 
A party who fails to respond to a request for admission may be 
sanctioned under Rule 37(c) as follows: 
Expenses on Failure to Admit. If a party fails to admit the genu-
ineness of any document or the truth of any matter as requested 
under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions 
thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or the truth 
of the matter, the requesting party may apply to the court for an 
order requiring the other party to pay the reasonable expenses 
incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney’s 
fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds that (1) the 
request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the 
admission sought was of no substantial importance, or (3) the 
party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that the 
party might prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good 
reason for the failure to admit.302 
In Carillo v. Boise Tire Company, a litigant refused to respond to an op-
posing party’s requests for admission.303 The opposing party sought an 
award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
37(c).304 Although it was not disputed that the request for admission 
had not been answered, the trial court denied an award of fees.305 The 
trial court reasoned that the uncooperative litigant’s denial of the re-
quests for admission were “not of substantial importance.”306 Since Rule 
37(c) allows for courts to decline to sanction a party for failure to admit 
when “the admission sought was of no substantial importance,”307 The 
                                                       
298. Blaser v. Riceci, 810 P.2d 1120, 1121, 119 Idaho 834, 835 (1991). 
299. Id.  
300. Id. at 1121–22, 119 Idaho at 835–36. 
301. Id. 
302. IDAHO R. CIV. P. 37(c). 
303. Carillo v. Boise Tire Company, 274 P.3d 1256, 1270, 152 Idaho 741, 755 (2012). 
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Idaho Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision not to award 
fees as within the bounds of the lower court’s discretion.308 Conversely, 
in Schwan’s Sales Enterprises v. Idaho Transportation Department, the 
Idaho Supreme Court upheld a lower court’s award of attorney fees as a 
sanction for a party’s failure to admit or deny a request for admis-
sion.309 There, the offending party had claimed it did not have sufficient 
information to answer the request, but had not made a reasonable in-
quiry.310 The Court explained that Rule 37(c) does not allow a party to 
assert lack of knowledge as a basis for failure to admit or deny without 
making a reasonable inquiry.311 Thus, the Court held, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion.312  
4. Attorney Fees Incurred by Misconduct Relating to Depositions, 
Interrogatories, or Requests for Inspection 
Subsection (d) of Rule 37 sets forth a variety of circumstances in 
which a party can be sanctioned for discovery-related misconduct: 
Failure of Party to Attend at Own Deposition or to Serve Answers 
to Interrogatories or Respond to Request for Inspection. If a party 
or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person 
designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a 
party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take deposi-
tion, after being served with a proper notice, or (2) to serve an-
swers or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, 
after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a writ-
ten response to request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, 
after proper service of the request, the court in which the action 
is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the 
failure as are just . . . . In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, 
the court shall require the party failing to act or the attorney 
advising that party or both to pay the reasonable expenses, in-
cluding attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the court 
finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other 
circumstance make an award of expenses unjust. The failure to 
act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the 
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the par-
ty failing to act has applied for a protective order as provided by 
Rule 26(c).  
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Appellate cases applying 37(d) are virtually non-existent.313 However, 
given that this subdivision contains the same “shall award . . . unless” 
language seen in subsections (a), (b), and (c), a party who wishes to ob-
tain an award of attorney fees under subsection (d) could lean on cases 
applying subsections (a), (b), and (c).   
5. Pre-Trial Party Conduct Relating to Settlement Discussions 
Parties’ conduct within settlement discussions falls outside the 
scope of discovery process sanctions.314 Idaho courts have held that a 
party may not be sanctioned under these rules for failing to engage in 
settlement discussions, or for conduct in the course of settlement discus-
sions.315 The Idaho Supreme Court explained the role of settlement ne-
gotiations with discovery rule sanctions in Bailey v. Sanford: 
Sanford argues the trial court abused its discretion by awarding 
attorney fees as a sanction for failing to participate in good faith 
in settlement negotiations. This Court has repeatedly held “[a] 
trial court’s consideration of failed settlement negotiations, or of 
a refusal to negotiate a settlement, when deciding whether to 
award attorney fees is prohibited under Idaho law.” Therefore, a 
trial court cannot sanction a party’s conduct at a settlement con-
ference by award attorney fees to the other party.316 
While improper settlement conduct does not fall under the ambit of Rule 
37, it is not entirely immune from sanctions.317 Under Idaho Code sec-
tion 12-121, courts may consider party actions in the settlement confer-
ence arena when determining whether to grant fees for frivolous con-
duct.318 
B. Improper Conduct in Filing Documents with the Court: Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 11(a)(1) & Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and Idaho Appellate Rule 11 con-
tain identical language.319 Both rules authorize attorney fee awards 
against parties who frivolously file court documents, or who misuse ju-
dicial proceedings. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and its appellate 
counterpart, Idaho Appellate Rule 11, both provide: 
                                                       
313. A Westlaw search conducted on May 1, 2016 for “37(d) /s fees” revealed no cas-
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The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate 
that the attorney or party has read the pleading, motion or other 
paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, 
and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact 
and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification, or reversal or existing law, and that 
it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass 
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation. If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in viola-
tion of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initia-
tive, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented 
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an 
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the rea-
sonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, 
motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.320 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 has been described as a “management 
tool to be used by the district court to weed out, punish, and deter specif-
ic frivolous and other misguided filings.”321  
The Idaho Supreme Court held last year that the identical lan-
guage of the Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and Idaho Appellate Rule 
11 warrant identical analysis.322 In Flying “A” Ranch, Inc. v. Board of 
County Commissioner for Fremont County, the Idaho Supreme Court 
explained that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 “provides two separate 
grounds for imposing sanctions: (a) frivolous filings and (b) misusing 
judicial procedures for an improper purpose.”323 The Flying “A” Ranch 
Court further explained that a party did not have to frivolously file doc-
uments and misuse judicial procedures for an improper purpose to be 
sanctioned, but instead, could be sanctioned for doing either.324   
Prior to the Court’s Flying “A” Ranch decision, the Court required a 
showing of bad faith before Idaho Appellate Rule 11 could be used to 
sanction a party. However, in Flying “A” Ranch, the Court declared that 
a finding of bad faith was no longer necessary to sanction a party for 
frivolous filings on appeal. The Court began by explaining its Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 11 analysis, which inquired into reasonableness un-
der the circumstances, with its prior Idaho Appellate Rule 41 analysis, 
which required a showing of bad faith: 
[i]n Riggins v. Smith, [a case where Idaho Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 11 was applied] we stated, “In light of an attorney’s con-
duct in filing a pleading, the district court must determine 
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whether the attorney exercised reasonableness under the cir-
cumstances and made a proper investigation upon reasonable 
inquiry into the facts and legal theories before signing and filing 
the document.” In affirming the award, we stated that “we find 
that the district court made sufficient findings of Smith’s failure 
to properly investigate . . . and of the unreasonableness of 
Smith’s inquiry to support its determination of sanctions against 
Smith under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1).” We did not require a finding that 
the attorney also filed any document for an improper purpose. 
This Court has still required a finding of an improper purpose to 
impose sanctions on appeal under Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2, 
which has identical wording to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
11(a)(1). However, we will henceforth construe Appellate Rule 
11.2 in the same manner as set for Civil Rule 11(a)(1). There is 
no reason to construe the identical wording in both rules differ-
ently. 
Thus, Idaho Court of Appeal no longer looks to whether the signing par-
ty acted in bad faith, but instead, to whether signing the document was 
reasonable under the circumstances.325 Reasonableness of inquiry is 
determined by what a party would have reasonably believed at the time 
a document is filed.326 This objective “reasonable inquiry” standard is 
more onerous than the old “bad faith” standard, so a party seeking an 
award of attorney fees on appeal should be cognizant of the recent 
change in Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2.327 
 
VI. “COMMON-LAW” GROUNDS FOR ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS 
Idaho courts have recognized what are frequently referred to as two 
common-law exceptions to the American Rule.328 The first of these ex-
ceptions provides for attorney fees where a private individual vindicated 
an important public policy.329 The second applies in condemnation pro-
ceedings.330 Despite the fact that these doctrines are sometimes de-
scribed as exceptions to the American Rule,331 they are more accurately 
characterized as exceptions to Idaho courts’ usual interpretation of Ida-
ho Code section 12-121.332 Idaho Code section 12-121 is generally inter-
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preted as requiring frivolous conduct.333 However, the plain language of 
the award allows for attorney fees in “any civil action.”334 Both excep-
tions allow for attorney fees under an interpretation of section 12-121 
that does not require a showing of frivolous conduct.335 
A. The Private Attorney General Doctrine 
Under the Private Attorney General Doctrine, Idaho courts may 
award attorney fees to a party who prevails in a suit that vindicates an 
important public policy.336 The Private Attorney General Doctrine is 
said to incentivize private litigation to enforce public rights.337 Some 
have questioned how strong that incentive actually is,338 because past 
decisions have made it difficult to predict whether a litigant invoking 
the doctrine would be successful.339  
The Idaho Supreme Court first recognized the Private Attorney 
General Doctrine in 1980 when it decided Ada County v. Red Steer 
Drive-Ins of Nevada, Inc.340 There, the Court adopted California’s pri-
vate attorney general doctrine, which utilized a three-part analysis to 
determine whether or not a party was entitled to an award of fees: 
[T]hree basic factors are to be considered in awarding attorney’s 
fees under the theory of private attorney general. They are: “(1) 
the strength or societal importance of the public policy vindicat-
ed by the litigation, (2) the necessity for private enforcement and 
the magnitude of the resultant burden on the plaintiff, [and] (3) 
the number of people standing to benefit from the decision.”341 
Ultimately, the Court in Red Steer declined to award fees under the Pri-
vate Attorney General Doctrine.342 But in Hellar v. Cenarrusa, the doc-
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334. IDAHO CODE § 12-121 (2015). 
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trine was applied to uphold an award of attorney fees where a party 
successfully challenged a legislative reapportionment scheme as violat-
ing the Idaho Constitution.343 In holding that the reapportionment 
scheme was contrary to the Idaho Constitution, the court reasoned that 
an award of fees to the plaintiff under the Private Attorney General 
Doctrine was proper because: 
The apportionment of the Idaho Legislature affects every Idaho 
citizen . . . . It would be hard to imagine a case which would be 
more appropriate for an award of attorney’s fees under the Pri-
vate Attorney General Theory than the instant case considering 
its magnitude and the number of Idaho citizens affected there-
by.344  
The defendants protested that Idaho law did not provide for an award of 
attorney fees in the absence of an applicable statute.345 The Court ad-
dressed this argument by suggesting that Idaho Code section 12-121 
was the source of authority for an award of fees under the Private At-
torney General Doctrine: 
We continue to adhere to the so-called “American rule” to the ef-
fect that attorney fees are to be awarded only where they are au-
thorized by statute or contract.  Since I.C. § 12-121 provides the 
trial court with discretion to award fees to the prevailing party, 
there is a statutory basis and the question [] becomes whether 
the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) limitation restricting the award to those 
cases which are “defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation” is applicable. We hold that the limitation does not 
apply where, as here, the award of attorney fees is under the 
Private Attorney General Doctrine.346 
Instead of using a “common law” justification for the Private Attorney 
General doctrine, the Heller Court simply determined that Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(e) did not limit Idaho Code section 12-121 frivolous 
or unreasonable cases in certain instances.347 Idaho Code section 12-121 
still provided a statutory basis for an award of attorney fees.348 Thus, 
Heller strongly suggests that characterizing the Private Attorney Gen-
eral Doctrine as an exception to the American Rule is not always accu-
rate. On the other hand, in Fox v. Board of County Commissioners, the 
Court upheld an award of attorney fees under the Private Attorney 
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346. Id. The express language of Idaho Code section 12-121 gives courts the broad 
authority to award attorney fees to the prevailing party “[i]n any civil action.”  IDAHO CODE § 
12-121 (2014); See also discussion supra Part V.A.  
347. Id. 
348. Id. 
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General doctrine without invoking 12-121 as a basis.349 This incon-
sistentcy renders the Private Attorney General Doctrine to be somewhat 
unpredictable in its interpretation and application. 
 
In 1984, Idaho Code section 12-117 was enacted to provide for attorney 
fee awards against individuals who successfully brought suit against 
public agencies.350 Eight years later, the Court, in Roe v. Harris, called 
into question the Private Attorney General Doctrine by holding it inap-
plicable in cases where parties could invoke Idaho Code section 12-
117.351 The Roe Court also discussed at length the interplay between 
section 12-117, the Private Attorney General Doctrine, and section 12-
121: 
The Court has never addressed the issue of the interplay be-
tween I.C. § 12–117 and the private attorney general doctrine. 
In many cases where the Court has discussed the private attor-
ney general doctrine, I.C. § 12–117 did not apply because a state 
agency was not involved. . . . Idaho Code § 12–117 was amended 
in 1994 so that it now applies to “a state agency, a city, a county or 
other taxing district.” I.C. § 12–117(1).352 Thus, in some cases in-
volving the private attorney general doctrine, I.C. § 12–117 did 
not apply, although it would now . . . . In Hellar v. Cenarrusa . . .  
the Court linked the authority to award attorney fees pursuant 
to the private attorney general doctrine to I.C. § 12–121. We 
must compare this formulation of the private attorney general 
doctrine to I.C. § 12–117 . . . . 
Therefore, we must first address whether there is a conflict be-
tween I.C. § 12–117 and the private attorney general doctrine, 
which draws its viability from I.C. § 12–121. If the question were 
simply a conflict between I.C. §§ 12–121 and –117, the latter 
would prevail . . . . Comparing the private attorney general doc-
trine with I.C. § 12–117, the private attorney general doctrine 
considers the value of the prevailing party's contribution, 
while I.C. § 12–117 considers the character of the losing party's 
case. This difference evidences a legislative intent to make the 
standard of I.C. § 12–117 the basis for an attorney fee award 
against a state agency, rather than the tests encompassed under 
the private attorney general doctrine. This legislative intent 
causes us to rule that the private attorney general doctrine is 
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not available as the basis for an award of attorney fees in a case 
against a state agency.353 
In 2012, the Idaho Supreme Court reiterated that Idaho Code section 
12-117 provides an exclusive basis for attorney fee awards against pub-
lic agencies.354 The Court has since held that section 12-117 is not actu-
ally the exclusive basis for attorney fee awards in cases involving state 
agencies.355 However, due to the nature of the Private Attorney General 
Doctrine—vindicating a valuable public purpose—cases where the doc-
trine might be invoked are highly likely to fall under the purview of 
Idaho Code section 12-117. The Idaho Legislature’s recent expansion of 
Idaho Code section 12-117 to administrative proceedings is likely to fur-
ther limit the application of the doctrine in the future.356 Because of the 
inconsistencies in Idaho courts’ application and analysis of the Private 
Attorney General Doctrine, a party requesting attorney fees from a pub-
lic entity would be well advised to cite Idaho Code section 12-117 as a 
basis for an award of attorney fees.357 
B. Condemnation Proceedings 
Idaho courts may award attorney fees in eminent domain proceed-
ings.358 Similar to cases involving the Private Attorney General Doc-
trine, Idaho courts today utilize a broad reading of Idaho Code section 
12-121 to award attorney fees in cases between condemnors and con-
demnees.359 Because Idaho courts awarding fees in condemnation pro-
ceedings invoke section 12-121, such awards have a statutory basis and 
thus are not a literal exception to the American Rule.  
In 1983, the Idaho Supreme Court decided Ada County Highway 
District By and Through Fairbanks v. Acarrequi.360  There, the Court 
upheld a lower court’s award of attorney fees to a litigant who success-
fully obtained an award of attorney fees against a local highway dis-
trict.361 The Court announced what came to be described as a common-
law exception to the American Rule:  
[W]e adopt a new view and hold that, in condemnation actions, 
attorneys’ fees may be awarded to the condemnee without a 
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showing and finding that the action was brought and pursued 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. . . .  
. . . . 
We now hold that an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to the 
condemnee in an eminent domain proceeding is a matter for the 
trial court’s guided discretion and . . . such award will only be 
overturned upon a showing of abuse [of discretion.]362 
Although the Acarrequi Court did not expressly state that section 12-
121 provided the basis for its award of attorney fees in that case,363 sub-
sequent cases have cited to Acarrequi as standing for the proposition 
that section 12-121 provides the basis for attorney fee awards in con-
demnation proceedings.364  
In order to determine whether a party is entitled to an award of 
fees in an eminent domain proceeding, Idaho courts apply a series of 
factors set forth in Acarrequi.365 These include: 
o  whether the condemnor had extended a settlement offer of 
at least ninety percent of the eventual jury verdict;  
o  whether the settlement offer was made in a reasonably 
timely fashion; 
o  whether there was any dispute as to the actual public use 
and necessity of the condemned property; and  
o  whether the condemnee voluntarily relinquished posses-
sion of the property at issue during the process of resolving 
a just compensation issue.366  
Commentators have noted that at least one case decided since Acarrequi 
arguably gave little weight to the Acarrequi factors and seemed to leave 
the determination of an award of attorney fees largely to the district 
court’s discretion.367 However, in recent cases the Court reaffirmed the 
Acarrequi factors as the proper framework under which to analyze 
whether or not a condemnee is entitled to an award of attorney fees.368  
Until 2014, only condemnees had received awards of attorney fees 
in condemnation proceedings.369 However, last year in State Depart-
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ment of Transportation v. Grathol, the Idaho Supreme Court awarded 
attorney fees to a condemnor for the first time: 
Despite never awarding fees to a condemnor, we have left open 
that possibility. We stated in Acarrequi: “Except in the most ex-
treme and unlikely situation, we cannot envision an award of at-
torneys’ fees and costs to a condemnor.” In subsequent decisions, 
this Court did not limit or withdraw that statement. Indeed, we 
reassert that courts can award attorney fees to a condemnor in 
extreme and unlikely situations.370  
The Grahol Court reiterated that a condemnee seeking an award of fees 
based on an eminent domain proceeding must meet the Accarequi fac-
tors.371 However, the Court set forth a heightened standard for con-
demnors seeking an award of attorney fees: 
First, the condemnor must have met all of [the] Acarrequi fac-
tors that applied to the condemnor. Second, the condemnor’s 
case must have been brought reasonably, not frivolously, and 
have adequate foundation. Finally, the condemnee must meet 
the standard in section 12-121. Fees can be awarded under sec-
tion 12-121 only when the court “finds, from the facts presented 
to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation.” When a district court de-
cides in its discretion that a case meets all three of these ele-
ments, the condemnor recovers its attorney fees.372 
If a condemnor can show the existence of the above factors, a court in its 
discretion can deem the case to be “extreme and unlikely” under the 
requisite Acarrequi analysis, and the condemnor may receive an award 
of attorney fees.373 Given the existence of Idaho Code section 12-117, 
which specifically deals with suits against government entities, it is un-
clear why section 12-121 is still applied to condemnation proceedings. 
VII. A NOTE ON IDAHO APPELLATE RULE 41 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 is frequently—and incorrectly—cited as a 
substantive basis for an award of attorney fees on appeal.374 Idaho Ap-
pellate Rule 41 sets forth the procedure for obtaining an award of attor-
ney fees on appeal. The first and most important requirement of the rule 
is that the party must place a request for fees in its initial brief: 
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Any party seeking attorney fees on appeal must assert such a 
claim as an issue presented on appeal in the first appellate brief 
filed by such party as provided by Rules 35(a)(5) and 35(b)(5); 
provided, however, the Supreme Court may permit a later claim 
for attorney fees under such conditions as it deems appropri-
ate.375 
Idaho Rule of Appellate Procedure 41 goes on to set forth other proce-
dural requirements for requesting a fee award on appeal: 
(b) Oral Argument on Attorney Fees. At the time of oral argument of 
an appeal, the parties may present argument as to whether or 
not the party claiming attorney fees has a legal right thereto. 
(c) Adjudication of Right to Attorney Fees. The Supreme Court in its 
decision on appeal shall include its determination of a claimed 
right to attorney fees, but such ruling will not contain the amount 
of attorney fees allowed. 
(d) Amount of Attorney Fees. If the Court determines that a party is 
entitled to attorney fees on appeal, the party claiming attorney 
fees shall file a claim concurrently with, or as part of, the memo-
randum of costs provided for by Rule 40. The claim for attorney 
fees, which at the discretion of the court may include paralegal 
fees, shall be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the 
method of computation of the attorney fees claimed. Attorney 
fees may also include the reasonable cost of automated legal re-
search (Computer Assisted Legal Research), if the court finds it 
was reasonably necessary in preparing the party's case. The op-
posing party may object to the amount of attorney fees claimed 
in the same manner as provided for objections to a memoran-
dum of costs in Rule 40. The Court shall determine the amount of 
attorney fees or remand this question to the district court or 
agency to hear additional evidence and determine the amount of 
attorney fees to be allowed. Upon the determination of the 
amount of attorney fees, the Clerk shall insert the amount 
thereof in the remittitur in the same manner as the Clerk in-
serts costs pursuant to Rule 40(f). 
(e) Number of Copies. An original and six copies of the claim or 
memorandum for attorney fees, objections to attorney fees, and 
briefs in support of or in opposition thereto shall be filed with 
the Clerk of the Supreme Court.376 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 is often misapplied in Idaho courts by parties 
who misunderstand that the Rule is a procedural directive to parties 
seeking an award of fees on appeal, rather than a substantive source of 
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authority for a court to award fees.377 To some degree, this is under-
standable, for language in some cases where I.A.R. 41 has been cited 
alongside Idaho Code section 12-121 could give the impression that 
I.A.R. 41 does provide a substantive basis for a fee award. This is par-
ticularly evident when I.A.R. 41 is utilized in tandem with Idaho Code 
section 12-121, which provides a substantive basis for an award of at-
torney fees at trial and on appeal.  
An example of the distinction between I.A.R. 41 and Idaho Code 
section 12-121 can be seen in Durrant v. Christensen, where the Idaho 
Supreme Court applied I.A.R. 41 and Idaho Code section 12-121 as fol-
lows: 
Christensen has requested an award of attorney fees on [peti-
tioner]’s direct appeal as provided for by I.A.R. 41(a) and I.C. § 
12-121. Such an award is appropriate when we are left with an 
abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended friv-
olously, unreasonably, or without foundation . . . .  The appel-
lants . . . have presented no persuasive argument that the dis-
trict court, in granting attorney fees, abused its discretion or 
misapplied the law, and we award attorney fees on appeal to 
Christensen in an amount to be determined as provided by 
I.A.R. 41(d).378 
At first blush, it might be assumed that the Court was citing both Idaho 
Appellate Rule 41 and Idaho Code section 12-121 as a grant of authority 
to award attorney fees for frivolous appeals. However, a more critical 
look at Durrant reveals that the party, Christensen, requested attorney 
fees on appeal by following the procedural requirement of Idaho Appel-
late Rule 41(a) by requesting fees in his brief.379 Idaho Appellate Rule 
41(d) was simply cited by the Christensen court as the procedural mech-
anism which the Court would determine the amount to be awarded.380 
In other words, Idaho Code section 12-121 was the substantive basis 
upon which the Court awarded attorney fees, and Idaho Appellate Rule 
41 provided the procedural mechanism for doing so.381   
The Idaho Supreme Court recently provided a succinct explanation 
of the relationship of Idaho Appellate Rule 41 to other rules and stat-
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utes that grant a court with the actual authority to award attorney fees 
to parties on appeal: 
Davis seeks an award of attorney fees under Idaho Appellate 
Rules 40 and 41. He has not cited any statutory or contractual 
provision authorizing such award. Idaho Appellate Rule 40 pro-
vides for the awarding of costs on appeal, and Rule 41 specifies 
the procedure for requesting an award of attorney fees on ap-
peal. Neither rule provides the authority for awarding attorney 
fees . . . . Therefore, we will not address that issue.382 
In International Real Estate Solutions, Inc. v. Arave, decided last year, 
the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the misapplication of Idaho Appel-
late Rule 41 in cases where an appeal is allegedly frivolous or unreason-
able: 
International Real Estate also requests attorney fees under 
I.A.R. 41, arguing that such an award is appropriate because the 
Araves brought this appeal frivolously and unreasonably. “We 
have repeatedly held that simply requesting an award of fees 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, without citing any statuto-
ry or contractual basis for the award, is insufficient to raise the 
issue of attorney fees on appeal.” Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 
371, 128 P.3d 897, 908 (2005).  Here, Intermountain Real Estate 
has failed to cite any statutory basis for its separate request for 
an award under I.A.R. 41.383 
As the International Real Estate Solutions Court explained, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has, in fact, repeatedly explained that a party’s mere 
citation to the rule is not, on its own, enough to warrant an award of 
attorney fees.384 Thus, despite some language that might indicate to the 
contrary, a party who wishes to obtain an award of fees on appeal must 
adhere to I.A.R. 41 by citing to a separate substantive basis for an 
award of attorney fees.385 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
As this Article hopefully illustrates, there are a vast array of con-
texts in which a litigant may obtain an award of attorney fees. However, 
the American Rule remains in force in Idaho in that a litigant must ac-
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curately cite to a contractual provision or an applicable statute as a pre-
requisite to receiving an award of attorney fees. Thus, it is well worth a 
relatively modest time investment to ensure that one properly sets forth 




                                                       
 * The author would like to recognize University of Idaho alum Tammy Springer, 
whose idea it was to create an updated overview of attorney fee awards in Idaho. The author 
would also like to thank Mark Perison, author of A Guide to Attorney Fee Awards in Idaho, 
for providing advice during the early splanning stages of this piece. See Mark D. Perison, A 
Guide to Attorney Fee Awards in Idaho, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 29 (1995). Finally, the author 
would like to express her warmest gratitude for the advice and guidance of her faculty advi-
sor, Professor Rich Seamon. 
